Markets for Influence
Flavio Menezes and
John Quiggin
No 151184, Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers from University of Queensland, School of Economics
Abstract:
We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence.Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation
Keywords: Marketing; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10
Date: 2007-07-15
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151184/files/WPR07_7.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Markets for influence (2010) 
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2009) 
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2009) 
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2007) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uqsers:151184
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.151184
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