Markets for Influence

Flavio Menezes and John Quiggin

No WPR09_2, Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers from Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland

Abstract: We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent- seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for in?uence. Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation

Date: 2009-09
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http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/WP/WPR09_02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Markets for influence (2010)
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2009)
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2007)
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2007)
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