Markets for Influence

Flavio Menezes and John Quiggin

No WP7R07, Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers from Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland

Abstract: We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence.Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation.

Keywords: Tullock contests; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/WP/WPR07_7.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Markets for influence (2010)
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2009)
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2009)
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rsm:riskun:r07_7

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