Markets for Influence

Flavio Menezes and John Quiggin

No 151189, Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence. Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation

Keywords: Marketing; Production Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11
Date: 2009-09-11
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151189/files/WPR09_02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Markets for influence (2010)
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2009)
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2007)
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uqsers:151189

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.151189

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