Markets for influence
Flavio Menezes and
John Quiggin
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2010, vol. 28, issue 3, 307-310
Abstract:
We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximize profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence. Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation.
Keywords: Contests; Oligopoly; Strategy; space (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2009) 
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2009) 
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2007) 
Working Paper: Markets for Influence (2007) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:28:y:2010:i:3:p:307-310
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