Revealed Preferences in a Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma: A Horse-Race Between Six Utility Functions
Topi Miettinen (),
Michael Kosfeld (),
Ernst Fehr () and
No 6358, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
We experimentally investigate behavior and beliefs in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Each subject had to choose an action as first mover and a conditional action as second mover. All subjects also had to state their beliefs about others’ second-mover choices. Using these elicited beliefs, we apply the transparent Selten-Krischker approach to compare the explanatory power of a few current models of social and moral preferences. We find clear differences in explanatory power between the preference models, both without and with control for the number of free parameters. The best-performing models explain about 80% of the observed behavior. We compare our results with those obtained from a conventional maximum-likelihood approach, and find that the results by and large agree. We also present a structural model of belief formation. We find a consensus bias–whereby subjects believe others behave like themselves–and payoff-salience driven optimism –whereby subjects overestimate the probabilities for favorable outcomes.
Keywords: cooperation; prisoners' dilemma; other-regarding preferences; categorical imperative; consensus effect; optimism; salience (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 D03 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-neu and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Revealed preferences in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma: A horse-race between six utility functions (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6358
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