Working Papers

From Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
Contact information at EDIRC.
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19-05: A Full Characterization of Best-Response Functions in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game*

Dan Kovenock and David Rojo Arjona

19-04: Endogenous Market Formation and Monetary Trade: an Experiment

Gabriele Camera, Dror Goldberg and Avi Weiss

19-03: A Bias Aggregation Theorem

Mark Schneider

19-01: Cooperation among strangers with and without a monetary system

Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

18-22: Trust in Humans and Robots: Economically Similar but Emotionally Different

Timothy Shields, Eric Schniter and Daniel Sznycer

18-21: The Tug-of-War in the Laboratory

Cary Deck and Roman Sheremeta

18-20: Your money or your time? Experimental evidence on overbidding in all-pay auctions

Adriana Breaban, Charles Noussair and Andrea Popescu

18-19: Modeling Interactions between Risk, Time, and Social Preferences

Mark Schneider

18-18: A Dual System Model of Risk and Time Preferences

Mark Schneider

18-17: Money Is More Than Memory

Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

18-16: Using Response Times to Measure Ability on a Cognitive Task

Aleksandr Alekseev

18-15: On Booms That Never Bust: Ambiguity in Experimental Asset Markets with Bubbles

Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González and Praveen Kujal

18-14: A Theory of Cultural Revivals

Murat Iyigun, Jared Rubin and Avner Seror

18-13: Selection in the Lab: A Network Approach

Aleksandr Alekseev and Mikhail Freer

18-12: Agglomeration and the Extent of the Market: An Experimental Investigation into Spatially Coordinated Exchange

Jordan Adamson

18-11: Causal versus Consequential Motives in Mental Models of Agent Social and Economic Action: Experiments, and the Neoclassical Diversion in Economics

Vernon Smith

18-10: The Supply Side Determinants of Territory and Conflict

Jordan Adamson and Erik Kimbrough

18-09: The Distribution of Information and the Price Efficiency of Markets

Brice Corgnet, Mark DeSantis and David Porter

18-08: Conditional Independence in a Binary Choice Experiment

Nathaniel Wilcox

18-07: Experimental Research on Contests

Roman Sheremeta

18-06: Culture and Colonial Legacy: Evidence from Public Goods Games

Latika Chaudhary, Jared Rubin, Sriya Iyer and Anand Shrivastava

18-05: Partners or Strangers? Cooperation, Monetary Trade, and the Choice of Scale of Interaction

Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

18-04: Equilibrium wage rigidity in directed search

Gabriele Camera and Jaehong Kim

18-03: Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding in Rent-Seeking Contests

Roman Sheremeta

18-02: Experimental Evidence on the Cyclicality of Investment

Cortney Rodet and Andrew Smyth

18-01: Indefinitely Repeated Contests: An Experimental Study

Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin and Andrew Smyth

17-26: How Product Innovation Can Affect Price Collusion

Andrew Smyth

17-25: New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Multi-Battle Contests

Shakun Mago and Roman Sheremeta

17-24: Information (Non)Aggregation in Markets with Costly Signal Acquisition

Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark DeSantis and David Porter

17-23: Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power

Tom Campbell and Nathaniel Wilcox

17-22: Bondholder Reorganization of Systemically Important Financial Institutions

Steven Gjerstad

17-21: No Mere Tautology: The Division of Labor is Limited by the Division of Labor

Andrew Smyth and Bart Wilson

17-20: Loss Aversion and the Quantity-Quality Tradeoff

Jared Rubin, Anya Samek and Roman Sheremeta

17-19: The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson and Roman Sheremeta

17-18: The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson

17-17: Equilibrium Play in Voluntary Ultimatum Games: Beneficence Cannot Be Extorted

Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson

17-16: Risk Preference, Time Preference, and Salience Perception

Jonathan Leland and Mark Schneider

17-15: Minimal Frames and Transparent Frames for Risk, Time, and Uncertainty

Jonathan Leland, Mark Schneider and Nathaniel Wilcox

17-14: Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty

Aidin Hajikhameneh and Jared Rubin

17-13: War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends

Erik Kimbrough, Kevin Laughren and Roman Sheremeta

17-12: Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games

Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

17-11: Gender, Punishment, and Cooperation: Men hurt others to advance their interests

Terence Burnham

17-10: A Flexible and Customizable Method for Assessing Cognitive Abilities

Terence Burnham, Harry Gakidis and Jeffrey Wurgler

17-09: A Flexible and Customizable Method for Assessing Cognitive Abilities

Andrea Civelli and Cary Deck

17-08: The Cultural Transmission of Trust Norms: Evidence from a Lab in the Field on a Natural Experiment

Jared Rubin and Elira Karaja

17-07: Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus

Charles Thomas

17-06: The Ideological Roots of Institutional Change

Murat Iyigun and Jared Rubin

17-05: Humans’ (incorrect) distrust of reflective decisions

Antonio Cabrales, Antonio Espín, Praveen Kujal and Stephen Rassenti

17-04: The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments

Roman Sheremeta and Timothy Shields

17-03: Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities

Pierre Boyer, Kai Konrad and Brian Roberson