The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany

Stefan Bauernschuster, Erik Hornung and Christoph Koenig

No 18277, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: How do health crises affect election results? We combine a panel of election results from 1893--1933 with spatial heterogeneity in excess mortality due to the 1918 Influenza to assess the pandemic's effect on voting behavior across German constituencies. Applying a dynamic differences-in-differences approach, we find that areas with higher influenza mortality saw a lasting shift towards left-wing parties. We argue that pandemic intensity increased the salience of public health policy, prompting voters to reward parties signaling competence in health issues. Alternative explanations such as pandemic-induced economic hardship, punishment of incumbents for inadequate policy responses, or polarization of the electorate towards more extremist parties are not supported by our findings.

Keywords: Pandemics; Elections; Health; Voting behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H51 I18 N34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP18277 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany (2023)
Working Paper: The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany (2023)
Working Paper: The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany (2023)
Working Paper: The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18277

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP18277
orders@cepr.org

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (repec@cepr.org).