Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Tjaša Bjedov (), Thierry Madiès () and Marie Claire Villeval
Additional contact information
Thierry Madiès: University of Fribourg, Bd de Pérolles 90 CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland

No 1507, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate.

Keywords: Coordination; communication; turn taking; conflict; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D74 H71 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2015/1507.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION IN A TWO-STAGE GAME (2016)
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2016)
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2015)
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1507

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