Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Tjaša Bjedov (), Thierry Madies () and Marie Claire Villeval
Additional contact information
Thierry Madies: University of Fribourg

No 8953, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate.

Keywords: conflict; turn taking; communication; coordination; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D74 H71 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - revised version published in: Economic Inquiry, 2016, 54 (3), 1519–1540.

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Related works:
Journal Article: COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION IN A TWO-STAGE GAME (2016)
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2016)
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2015)
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2015)
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