Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Tjaša Bjedov (), Thierry Madiès () and Marie Claire Villeval
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Thierry Madiès: Université de Fribourg, Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales - Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg = University of Freiburg

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Abstract: We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution regardless of whether communication is unilateral or bilateral.

Keywords: Coordination; communication; turn taking; conflict; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Economic Inquiry, 2016, 54 (3), pp.1519-1540. ⟨10.1111/ecin.12325⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION IN A TWO-STAGE GAME (2016)
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2015)
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2015)
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01246166

DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12325

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