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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Tjaša Bjedov (), Thierry Madiès and Marie Claire Villeval ()
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Thierry Madiès: Université de Fribourg, Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales - Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

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Abstract: We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate.

Keywords: experiment; communication; turn taking; conflict; Coordination; one-way communication; two-way communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 2015
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01139112v2
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Related works:
Journal Article: COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION IN A TWO-STAGE GAME (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2016)
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game (2015) Downloads
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