Raising the Price of Talk: An Experimental Analysis of Transparent Leadership
Daniel Houser (),
Sandra J. Peart () and
Erte Xiao ()
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Kail Padgitt: Tax Foundation
Sandra J. Peart: University of Richmond
No 1048, Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science
Does transparent leadership promote cooperative groups? We address this issue using a public goods experiment with exogenously selected leaders who are able to send non-binding contribution suggestions to the group. To investigate the effect of transparency in this setting we vary the ease with which a leaderâ€™s actions are known by the group. We find leadersâ€™ suggestions encourage cooperation in all treatments, but that both leaders and their group members are more likely to follow leadersâ€™ recommendations when institutions are transparent so that non-leaders can easily see what the leader does. Consequently, transparency leads to significantly more cooperation, higher group earnings and reduced variation in contributions among group members. Length: 46
Keywords: experimental; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Raising the price of talk: An experimental analysis of transparent leadership (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gms:wpaper:1048
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