Information nudges and self control

Thomas Mariotti, Nikolaus Schweizer, Nora Szech and Jonas von Wangenheim
Additional contact information
Thomas Mariotti: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Nikolaus Schweizer: Tilburg University [Netherlands]
Jonas von Wangenheim: Universität Bonn = University of Bonn

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Abstract: We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For any distribution of risks, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending abstinence if riskiness is high enough. Depending on the distribution of risks, more or less consumers may have to be sacriced in that they cannot be warned even though they would like to be. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible warning to abstain must be tightened, but this need not increase the probability of harmful consumption. If some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, traffic-light nudges turn out to be optimal and, when subgroups of consumers differ sufficiently, the optimal traffic-light nudge is also subgroup-optimal. We finally compare the consumer-optimal nudge with those a health authority or a lobbyist would favor.

Keywords: Nudges; Information Design; Present-Biased Preferences; Self-Control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-nud and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04198487v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Management Science, 2023, 69 (4), pp.2182-2197. ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2022.4428⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2023)
Working Paper: Information nudges and self control (2022)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2021)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self Control (2021)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self Control (2021)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2018)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2018)
Working Paper: Information nudges and self-control (2018)
Working Paper: Information nudges and self-control (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04198487

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4428

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