Information Nudges and Self-Control

Thomas Mariotti, Nikolaus Schweizer, Nora Szech and Jonas von Wangenheim

No 13299, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is optimal.

Keywords: Information design; Information nudges; Present-biased preferences; Self-control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13299 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2023)
Working Paper: Information nudges and self control (2023)
Working Paper: Information nudges and self control (2022)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2021)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self Control (2021)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self Control (2021)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2018)
Working Paper: Information nudges and self-control (2018)
Working Paper: Information nudges and self-control (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13299

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13299

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().