Information Nudges and Self-Control
Thomas Mariotti,
Nikolaus Schweizer,
Nora Szech and
Jonas von Wangenheim
No 13299, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is optimal.
Keywords: Information design; Information nudges; Present-biased preferences; Self-control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2023) 
Working Paper: Information nudges and self control (2023) 
Working Paper: Information nudges and self control (2022) 
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2021) 
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self Control (2021) 
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self Control (2021) 
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2018) 
Working Paper: Information nudges and self-control (2018) 
Working Paper: Information nudges and self-control (2018) 
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