Information Nudges and Self-Control
Thomas Mariotti,
Nikolaus Schweizer,
Nora Szech and
Jonas von Wangenheim
No 7346, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For any distribution of risks, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending abstinence if the risk is high enough. Depending on the distribution of risks, more or less consumers have to be sacrificed, as they cannot be credibly warned even though they would like to be. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible warning to abstain must be tightened, but this need not increase the probability of harmful consumption. If some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, traffic-light nudges turn out to be optimal and, when subgroups of consumers differ sufficiently, the optimal traffic-light nudge is also subgroup-optimal. We finally compare the consumer-optimal nudge with those a health authority or a lobbyist would favor.
Keywords: nudges; information design; present-biased preferences; self-control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7346.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2023) 
Working Paper: Information nudges and self control (2023) 
Working Paper: Information nudges and self control (2022) 
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2021) 
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self Control (2021) 
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self Control (2021) 
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2018) 
Working Paper: Information nudges and self-control (2018) 
Working Paper: Information nudges and self-control (2018) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7346
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