Information nudges and self-control

Thomas Mariotti, Nikolaus Schweizer, Nora Szech and Jonas von Wangenheim

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is optimal.

Keywords: information design; information nudges; present-biased preferences; selfcontrol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/187773/1/1041045611.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2023)
Working Paper: Information nudges and self control (2023)
Working Paper: Information nudges and self control (2022)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2021)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self Control (2021)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self Control (2021)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2018)
Working Paper: Information Nudges and Self-Control (2018)
Working Paper: Information nudges and self-control (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2018304

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