Working in Family Firms: Paid Less But More Secure? Evidence from French Matched Employer-Employee Data

Andrea Bassanini, Thomas Breda (), Eve Caroli and Antoine Reberioux

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Abstract: The authors study compensation packages in family- and non-family-owned firms. Using French matched employer-employee data, they first find that family firms pay on average lower wages. Part of this wage gap is due to low-wage workers sorting into family firms and high-wage workers sorting into non-family-owned firms; however, they also find evidence that company wage policies differ according to ownership status, so that the same worker is paid differently under family and non-family firm ownership. In addition, family firms are characterized by lower job insecurity, as measured by lower dismissal rates. Family firms appear to rely less on dismissals, and more on hiring reductions, than do non-family-owned firms when they downsize. Compensating wage differentials account for a substantial part of the inverse relationship between the family/non-family gaps in wages and job security.

Keywords: Family firms; Non-family firms; French matched employer-employee data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (66)

Published in Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 2013, 66 (2), pp.433-466. ⟨10.1177/00197939130660020⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Working in Family Firms: Paid Less but More Secure? Evidence from French Matched Employer-Employee Data (2013)
Working Paper: Working in Family Firms: Paid Less But More Secure? Evidence from French Matched Employer-Employee Data (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00832786

DOI: 10.1177/00197939130660020

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