The Distinct Impact of Information and Incentives on Cheating

Julien Benistant (), Fabio Galeotti and Marie Claire Villeval
Additional contact information
Julien Benistant: GATE, University of Lyon

No 14014, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study a dynamic variant of the die-under-the-cup task where players can repeatedly misreport the outcomes of consecutive die rolls to earn more money, either under a non- competitive piece rate scheme or in a two-player competitive tournament. In this dynamic setting we test (i) whether giving continuous feedback (vs. final ex post feedback) on the opponent's reported outcome to both players encourages cheating behavior, and (ii) to what extent this influence depends on the incentive scheme in use (piece rate vs. tournament). We also vary whether the opponent is able to cheat or not. We find that people lie more when placed in a competitive rather than a non-competitive setting, but only if both players can cheat in the tournament. Continuous feedback on the counterpart's reports increases cheating under the piece-rate scheme but not in a competitive setting. Our results provide new insights on the role that feedback plays on cheating behavior in dynamic settings under different payment schemes, and shed light on the origins of the effect of competition on dishonesty.

Keywords: dishonesty; experiment; peer effects; feedback; competitive incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D83 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published - revised version published as 'Competition, information, and the erosion of morals' in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization , 2022, 204, 148-163,

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Distinct Impact of Information and Incentives on Cheating (2021)
Working Paper: The Distinct Impact of Information and Incentives on Cheating (2021)
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