Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects

Boris Hirsch, Thorsten Schank and Claus Schnabel

No 4126, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Using a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for men and workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to non-employment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than one year. Our results indicate that works councils primarily represent the interests of a specific clientele.

Keywords: duration models; works council; separations; collective voice; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J53 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published - published in: Industrial Relations, 2010, 49 (4), 566-592

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https://docs.iza.org/dp4126.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects (2009)
Working Paper: Work councils and separations: voice, monopoly, and insurance effects (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4126

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