Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment

Christiane Bradler, Robert Dur, Susanne Neckermann and Arjan Non

No 8311, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of unannounced, public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. Our results are consistent with workers having a preference for conformity and being reciprocal at the same time.

Keywords: employee motivation; recognition; reciprocity; conformity; field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: Management Science, 2016, 62(11), 3085-3099

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https://docs.iza.org/dp8311.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment (2013)
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