The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Levine's Working Paper Archive from David K. Levine

Date: 2004-06-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Chapter: The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games (2008)
Journal Article: The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games (2007)
Working Paper: The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (2007)
Working Paper: The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000030

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