Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation

Ernst Fehr, Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher

No 2925, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. When communication or informal sanctions are available, however, appropriation behaviour is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.

Keywords: Common pool resources; Experiments; Fairness; Reciprocity; Game theory; Fairness models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Appropriating the Commons A Theoretical Explanation (2001)
Working Paper: Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation
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