The Regulation of Entry

Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer

No 2953, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data covers the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.

Keywords: Regulation; Business entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 K20 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

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Journal Article: The Regulation of Entry (2002)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2002)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2001)
Working Paper: The regulation of entry (2001)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2000)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2000)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry
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