RAND Journal of Economics

1984 - 2005

Continuation of Bell Journal of Economics. Continued by RAND Journal of Economics.

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Volume 15, issue 4, 1984

Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing pp. 447-470

David P. Baron and David Besanko

Economies of Density versus Economies of Scale: Why Trunk and Local Service Airline Costs Differ pp. 471-489

Douglas W. Caves, Laurits R. Christensen and Michael W. Tretheway

Financially Constrained Entry in a Game with Incomplete Information pp. 490-499

Jean-Pierre Benoit

The Random Character of Merger Activity pp. 500-509

William Shughart and Robert Tollison

Interdependent Preferences and the Competitive Wage Structure pp. 510-520

Robert Frank

The Association between Insider Trading and Information Announcements pp. 521-536

John Elliott, Dale Morse and Gordon Richardson

Asset Salvageability and the Potential for Trade Restraint through Merger pp. 537-545

Richard Dowell

Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly pp. 546-554

Nirvikar Singh and Xavier Vives

The Production of Housing Services and the Derived Demand for Residential Energy pp. 555-567

John Quigley

On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection pp. 568-577

Russell Cooper

The Moral Hazard of Budget-Breaking pp. 578-581

Mukesh Eswaran and Ashok Kotwal

Volume 15, issue 3, 1984

Reputation and Product Quality pp. 311-327

Franklin Allen

The Determinants of Technology Adoption: The Case of the Banking Firm pp. 328-335

Timothy Hannan and John McDowell

Durable Good Monopolies with Rational Expectations and Replacement Sales pp. 336-345

Eric Bond and Larry Samuelson

Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification pp. 346-359

Howard P. Marvel and Stephen McCafferty

Optimal Pricing in Electrical Networks over Space and Time pp. 360-376

Roger E. Bohn, Michael C. Caramanis and Fred C. Schweppe

Dual Equilibria and Discontinuous Response in Monopolistic Competition with Two Classes of Consumers pp. 377-384

Norman J. Ireland

Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination pp. 385-395

Erin Anderson and David C. Schmittlein

On the Economics of Repeat Buying pp. 396-403

Jacques Crémer

Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information pp. 404-415

Lucian Bebchuk

The Walrasian Tâtonnement Mechanism and Information pp. 416-425

Patrick Joyce

Noncooperative Behavior by a Cartel as an Entry-Deterring Signal pp. 426-433

Joseph Harrington

Conditions for Investor and Customer Indifference to Transitions among Regulatory Treatments of Deferred Income Taxes pp. 434-446

A. Lawrence Kolbe, William B. Tye and Miriam Alexander Baker

Volume 15, issue 2, 1984

Tobin's q, Unionization, and the Concentration-Profits Relationship pp. 159-170

Michael Salinger

Monopoly with Incomplete Information pp. 171-196

Eric Maskin and John Riley

Competition with Lumpy Investment pp. 197-212

Richard Gilbert and Richard Harris

The Learning Curve and Pricing in the Chemical Processing Industries pp. 213-228

Marvin B. Lieberman

A Policy to Prevent Rational Test-Market Predation pp. 229-243

David Scharfstein

The Effects of Entry Regulation on Oligopolistic Interaction: The Uruguayan Banking Sector pp. 244-254

Pablo Spiller and Edgardo Favaro

Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency pp. 255-267

Michael Waldman

A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation pp. 271-280

Steven Shavell

Learning and the Behavior of Potential Entrants pp. 281-289

Gautam Bhattacharya

Ex ante Randomization in Agency Models pp. 290-301

John C. Fellingham, Young K. Kwon and D. Paul Newman

Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation pp. 305-309

Paul Milgrom

Volume 15, issue 1, 1984

Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry pp. 1-11

B. Douglas Bernheim

Estimating Effective Concentration in Deregulated Wholesale Electricity Markets pp. 12-26

Richard Schmalensee and Bennett W. Golub

An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints pp. 27-38

G.F. Mathewson and Ralph Winter

Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract pp. 39-53

William P. Rogerson

Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance pp. 54-68

Ralph A. Walkling and Michael S. Long

Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry) Costs pp. 69-84

Don Coursey, R. Isaac, Margaret Luke and Vernon Smith

Rate Base Selection and the Structure of Regulation pp. 85-95

Bruce C. Greenwald

Oligopolistic Competition, Product Variety, Entry Deterrence, and Technology Transfer pp. 99-107

Jonathan Eaton and Henryk Kierzkowski

On Delegating Price Authority to a Regulated Firm pp. 108-115

Michael Riordan

Time-of-Day Pricing in the U.S. Electric Power Industry at the Turn of the Century pp. 116-126

William J. Hausman and John Neufeld

Socially Optimal Pricing with Rivalry and Economies of Scale pp. 127-134

Ronald R. Braeutigam

Resolution of Conjectures on the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly pp. 135-141

Thijs ten Raa

Controlling Stochastic Pollution Events through Liability Rules: Some Evidence from OCS Leasing pp. 142-151

James Opaluch and Thomas A. Grigalunas

Uncovering Regulators' Social Welfare Weights pp. 152-155

Thomas Ross