RAND Journal of Economics

1984 - 2005

Continuation of Bell Journal of Economics. Continued by RAND Journal of Economics.

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Volume 19, issue 4, 1988

Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries pp. 495-515

Timothy Dunne, Mark Roberts and Larry Samuelson

Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers pp. 516-537

Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole

Cost-Reducing and Demand-Creating R&D with Spillovers pp. 538-556

Richard C. Levin and Peter C. Reiss

State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of New York's 1985 Takeover Statutes pp. 557-567

Laurence Schumann

Exit with Multiplant Firms pp. 568-588

Michael Whinston

The Determinants of Board Composition pp. 589-606

Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Weisbach

On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities pp. 607-622

James Friedman

Diversification, Ricardian Rents, and Tobin's q pp. 623-632

Cynthia A. Montgomery and Birger Wernerfelt

Volume 19, issue 3, 1988

A General Model of R&D Competition and Policy pp. 317-326

Avinash Dixit

Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length pp. 327-343

Keith J. Crocker and Scott Masten

Randomization with Asymmetric Information pp. 344-362

Richard Arnott and Joseph Stiglitz

Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study pp. 363-388

Carolyn Pitchik and Andrew Schotter

Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies pp. 389-407

Vojislav Maksimovic

Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger pp. 408-419

Henrik Horn and Asher Wolinsky

Speculative Carryover: An Empirical Examination of the U.S. Refined Copper Market pp. 420-437

Walter Thurman

Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions pp. 438-457

Tracy Lewis and David Sappington

Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond pp. 458-466

Birger Wernerfelt

Regulation and Legislative Choice pp. 467-477

David P. Baron

Modelling the Connections in the Cross Section between Technical Progress and R&D Intensity pp. 478-485

Richard Nelson

Mendeloff's The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation: How Overregulation Causes Underregulation pp. 489-494

Jerry L. Mashaw

Volume 19, issue 2, 1988

The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation pp. 157-172

David Cutler and Lawrence Summers

Simultaneous Signalling to the Capital and Product Markets pp. 173-190

Robert Gertner, Robert Gibbons and David Scharfstein

The Impact of Trade Unions on Incentives to Deter Entry pp. 191-199

Mathias Dewatripont

An Empirical Analysis of Dynamic, Nonprice Competition in an Oligopolistic Industry pp. 200-220

Mark Roberts and Larry Samuelson

"Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities pp. 221-234

Carmen Matutes and Pierre Regibeau

Coordination through Committees and Markets pp. 235-252

Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner

Price Discrimination and Patent Policy pp. 253-265

Jerry Hausman and Jeffrey Mackie-Mason

The Advantages of Imprecise Information pp. 266-275

Esther Gal-Or

Joint Bidding, Entry, and the Price of OCS Leases pp. 276-284

Carlisle Moody and W.J. Kruvant

Money-Back Contracts with Double Moral Hazard pp. 285-292

Duncan P. Mann and Jennifer P. Wissink

On Vertical Restraints and the Law: A Note pp. 293-297

Michael Waterson

On Vertical Restraints and the Law: A Reply pp. 298-301

Frank Mathewson and Ralph Winter

Litan's What Should Banks Do? A Review Essay pp. 305-315

Lawrence White

Volume 19, issue 1, 1988

Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions pp. 1-26

Bernard Caillaud, Roger Guesnerie, Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole

Revenue Sharing as an Incentive in an Agency Problem: An example from the National Football League pp. 27-43

Scott Atkinson, Linda R. Stanley and John Tschirhart

Auctions with Endogenous Quantity pp. 44-58

Robert G. Hansen

Advertising and Limit Pricing pp. 59-71

Kyle Bagwell and Garey Ramey

Ability, Moral Hazard, Firm Size, and Diversification pp. 72-87

Debra J. Aron

A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding pp. 88-101

Michael J. Fishman

Revealed Bureaucratic Preference: Priorities of the Consumer Product Safety Commission pp. 102-113

Lacy Glenn Thomas

Preemptive Investment Timing pp. 114-122

David Mills

Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs pp. 123-137

Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro

Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms pp. 138-146

Alison J. Kirby

Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack pp. 147-155

David Scharfstein

Volume 18, issue 4, 1987

An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks pp. 465-479

W Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat and Joel Huber

Market Structure and Optimal Management Organizations pp. 480-491

Clive Bull and Janusz A. Ordover

Pan American to United: The Pacific Division Transfer Case pp. 492-508

Franklin M. Fisher

Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting pp. 509-532

David P. Baron and David Besanko

Postentry Investment and Market Structure in the Chemical Processing Industries pp. 533-549

Marvin B. Lieberman

Optimality and Sustainability: Regulation and Intermodal Competition in Telecommunications pp. 550-563

Michael A. Einhorn

The Neoclassical Model of Consumer Demand with Identically Priced Commodities: An Application to Time-of-Use Electricity Pricing pp. 564-580

Douglas W. Caves, Laurits R. Christensen and Joseph Herriges

Cooperatives as Entrants pp. 581-595

Richard J. Sexton and Terri A. Sexton

Long-Term Competition in a Dynamic Game: The Cold Fish War pp. 596-610

Jonathan Cave

An Asymmetric Common-Value Auction Model pp. 611-621

Donald B. Hausch

Volume 18, issue 3, 1987

The Effects of Price Restrictions on Competition Between National and Local Firms pp. 333-347

Patrick J. DeGraba

Mechanisms for Incentive Regulation: Theory and Experiment pp. 348-359

James Cox and R. Isaac

Licensing to Enhance Demand for New Technologies pp. 360-368

Andrea Shepard

Hierarchical Regulatory Control pp. 369-383

Joel S. Demski and David Sappington

On the Misuse of the Profits-Sales Ratio to Infer Monopoly Power pp. 384-396

Franklin M. Fisher

A Core Selection for Regulating a Single-Output Monopoly pp. 397-407

Herve Moulin

The Costs of Price Regulation: Lessons from Railroad Deregulation pp. 408-416

Kenneth D. Boyer

Rate-Setting by Diagnosis Related Groups and Hospital Specialization pp. 417-427

David Dranove

Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams pp. 428-435

Eric Rasmusen

On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts pp. 436-451

Jacques Crémer and Michael Riordan

The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives pp. 452-458

Steven D. Sklivas

Magat, Krupnick, and Harrington's Rules in the Making: A Statistical Analysis of Regulatory Agency Behavior pp. 461-464

Roger Noll

Volume 18, issue 2, 1987

Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information pp. 165-186

Garth Saloner

Facilitating Practices: The Effects of Advance Notice and Best-Price Policies pp. 187-197

Charles Holt and David T. Scheffman

Credible Pretrial Negotiation pp. 198-210

Barry Nalebuff

Oligopolistic Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information pp. 211-231

Joseph Harrington

Public Regulation and the Structure of Production in Multiproduct Industries: An Application to the New England Otter Trawl Industry pp. 232-247

Dale Squires

Noncooperative Collusion in Durable Goods Oligopoly pp. 248-254

Faruk Gul

One is Almost Enough for Monopoly pp. 255-274

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Raymond J. Deneckere

Job Transfers and Incentives in Complex Organizations: Thwarting the Ratchet Effect pp. 275-286

Barry W. Ickes and Larry Samuelson

Dropout Behavior in R&D Races with Learning pp. 287-295

Steve A. Lippman and Kevin F. McCardle

Competition for Agency Contracts pp. 296-307

Randolph McAfee and John McMillan

Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings pp. 308-315

Daniel L. Rubinfeld and David Sappington

Mueller's Profits in the Long Run pp. 319-332

Ariel Pakes

Volume 18, issue 1, 1987

A Theory of Market Structure with Sequential Entry pp. 1-16

B. Eaton and Roger Ware

Investment and Coordination in Oligopolistic Industries pp. 17-33

Richard Gilbert and Marvin Lieberman

Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry pp. 34-39

Joseph Farrell

The Values of Waiting Time, Travel Time, and a Seat on a Bus pp. 40-56

Herbert Mohring, John Schroeter and Paitoon Wiboonchutikula

Second Sourcing and the Experience Curve: Price Competition in Defense Procurement pp. 57-76

James Anton and Dennis A. Yao

Managing Supplier Switching pp. 77-97

Joel S. Demski, David Sappington and Pablo Spiller

The Invariance of Market Innovation to the Number of Firms pp. 98-108

Raaj Sah and Joseph Stiglitz

The Demand for Local Telephone Service: A Fully Discrete Model of Residential Calling Patterns and Service Choices pp. 109-123

Kenneth Train, Daniel McFadden and Moshe Ben-Akiva

Compliance, Avoidance, and Evasion: Emissions Control Under Imperfect Enforcement in Steam-Electric Generation pp. 124-137

Dan A. Fuller

The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs pp. 138-150

Paul Klemperer

Competition and Rail Rates for the Shipment of Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat pp. 151-163

James MacDonald