RAND Journal of Economics
1984 - 2005
Continuation of Bell Journal of Economics. Continued by RAND Journal of Economics. From The RAND Corporation Bibliographic data for series maintained by (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 25, issue 4, 1994
- The Commitment Value of Contracts under Dynamic Renegotiation pp. 501-517

- Paul Beaudry and Michel Poitevin
- Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical Firms Choose Different Incentives for Their Managers pp. 518-537

- Benjamin Hermalin
- The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions pp. 538-554

- Richard Gilbert and David M Newbery
- Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model pp. 555-589

- Ariel Pakes and Paul McGuire
- Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods pp. 590-607

- Douglas Gale and Robert Rosenthal
- Asymmetric Price Competition with Price Inertia pp. 608-618

- Arthur Fishman
- Service Time Competition pp. 619-634

- Ivan Png and David Reitman
Volume 25, issue 3, 1994
- The Determinants of Efficiency and Solvency in Savings and Loans pp. 361-381

- Benjamin Hermalin and Nancy E. Wallace
- Irreversible Choice of Uncertain Technologies with Network Externalities pp. 382-401

- Jay Choi
- Do Important Drugs Reach the Market Sooner? pp. 402-423

- David Dranove and David Meltzer
- The Capital Structure of a Regulated Firm pp. 424-440

- Yossef Spiegel and Daniel Spulber
- Learning by Doing and Competition in the Early Rayon Industry pp. 441-454

- Ron Jarmin
- Double Moral Hazard and Resale Price Maintenance pp. 455-466

- Richard Romano
- Market Power and Mergers in Laboratory Markets with Posted Prices pp. 467-487

- Douglas Davis and Charles Holt
- Plant Age and Technology Use in US. Manufacturing Industries pp. 488-499

- Timothy Dunne
Volume 25, issue 2, 1994
- Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules pp. 197-214

- Kathryn E. Spier
- An Empirical Investigation of Procurement Contract Structures pp. 215-241

- Gregory Vistnes
- Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation pp. 242-262

- Steven Berry
- Optional Time-of-Use Prices for Electricity: Econometric Analysis of Surplus and Pareto Impacts pp. 263-283

- Kenneth Train and Gil Mehrez
- Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard pp. 284-296

- Benjamin F. Blair and Tracy Lewis
- Curbing Agency Problems in the Procurement Process by Protest Oversight pp. 297-318

- Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Meurer and Jean-Francois Richard
- The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis pp. 319-333

- Josh Lerner
- Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity Constraints pp. 334-347

- Douglas Holtz-Eakin, David Joulfaian and Harvey Rosen
- Open- versus Closed-Door Negotiations pp. 348-359

- Motty Perry and Larry Samuelson
Volume 25, issue 1, 1994
- Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game pp. 1-19

- Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein
- Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale pp. 20-36

- Steven Shavell
- Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee pp. 37-57

- Glenn Ellison
- News Management and the Value of Firms pp. 58-71

- Hyun Song Shin
- On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game pp. 72-93

- Yun Joo Jung, John Kagel and Dan Levin
- Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation Criteria pp. 94-109

- W Viscusi
- Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property-Casualty Insurance Markets pp. 110-127

- Anne Gron
- Product Portfolios and the Introduction of New Products: An Example from the Insecticide Industry pp. 128-140

- Peter Burton
- Inventories and the Short-Run Dynamics of Commodity Prices pp. 141-159

- Robert Pindyck
- Hedonic Price Indexes for Spreadsheets and an Empirical Test for Network Externalities pp. 160-170

- Neil Gandal
- How Hospital Ownership Affects Access to Care for the Uninsured pp. 171-185

- Edward Norton and Doug Staiger
- Dynamic Duopoly with Best-Price Clauses pp. 186-196

- Monika Schnitzer
Volume 24, issue 4, 1993
- Preemptive Investment with Resalable Capacity pp. 479-502

- Murugappa Krishnan and Lars-Hendrick Roller
- Rank, Stock, Order, and Epidemic Effects in the Diffusion of New Process Technologies: An Empirical Model pp. 503-528

- Massoud Karshenas and Paul Stoneman
- Regulation of Multiagent Research and Development pp. 529-541

- Trond Olsen
- Did Deregulation Affect Aircraft Engine Maintenance? An Empirical Policy Analysis pp. 542-558

- David Kennet
- Equilibrium and Adverse Selection pp. 559-569

- Colin Rose
- Horizontal Subcontracting pp. 570-590

- Yossef Spiegel
- Capital Investment Strategies under Uncertain Regulation pp. 591-604

- Elizabeth Olmstead Teisberg
- The Medicare Hospice Benefit: The Effectiveness of Price Incentives in Health Care Policy pp. 605-624

- Vivian Hamilton
- Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards pp. 625-630

- Louis Kaplow
- Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation pp. 631-645

- James Friedman and Jacques Thisse
- Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products Oligopoly pp. 646-668

- David Besanko and Martin K. Perry
- Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions pp. 668-680

- Yeon-Koo Che
- Fulfilled Expectations of Entry pp. 681-695

- Jaehong Kim
Volume 24, issue 3, 1993
- Mortal Managers and Long-Term Goals: An Impossibility Result pp. 313-327

- Carlos Alberto Mello-e-Souza
- Working Capital and Fixed Investment: New Evidence on Financing Constraints pp. 328-342

- Steven Fazzari and Bruce Petersen
- Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis pp. 343-356

- Daniel F. Rubinfeld and Suzanne Scotchmer
- Takeover Motives during the Conglomerate Merger Wave pp. 357-379

- John Matsusaka
- Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services pp. 380-398

- Asher Wolinsky
- Consumer Choice and Cournot Behavior in Capacity-Constrained Duopoly Competition pp. 399-417

- Leonard F. Herk
- The Effect of Industrial Structure on Learning by Doing in Nuclear Power Plant Operation pp. 418-438

- Richard K. Lester and Mark J. McCabe
- Demand and Pricing of Telecommunications Services: Evidence and Welfare Implications pp. 439-454

- Carlos Martins-Filho and John Mayo
- Information Sharing in Oligopoly: The Truth-Telling Problem pp. 455-465

- Amir Ziv
- Incentives for Cost-Reducing Investment in a Signalling Model of Product Quality pp. 466-477

- Shiou Shieh
Volume 24, issue 2, 1993
- R&D: Competition, Risk, and Performance pp. 157-197

- Herman C. Quirmbach
- The Profitability of Innovating Firms pp. 198-211

- Paul Geroski, Stephen Machin and John van Reenen
- Middlemen as Experts pp. 212-223

- Gary Biglaiser
- Complexity Considerations and Market Behavior pp. 224-235

- Chaim Fershtman and Ehud Kalai
- I'm Not a High-Quality Firm -- But I Play One on TV pp. 236-247

- Mark Hertzendorf
- Underinvestment and Incompetence as Responses to Radical Innovation: Evidence from the Photolithographic Alignment Equipment Industry pp. 248-270

- Rebecca Henderson
- Coordination, Incentives, and the Ratchet Effect pp. 271-285

- John M. Litwack
- Corporate Financial Policy, Taxation, and Macroeconomic Risk pp. 286-303

- Mark Gertler and Robert Hubbard
- The Crowding-Out Effects of Long Duration of Patents pp. 304-312

- Chien-fu Chou and Oz Shy
Volume 24, issue 1, 1993
- Market Power and Price Increases for Basic Cable Service Since Deregulation pp. 1-18

- Robert N. Rubinovitz
- Did Installed Base Given an Incumbent Any (Measurable) Advantages in Federal Computer Procurement? pp. 19-39

- Shane Greenstein
- Bargaining with Noisy Delegation pp. 40-57

- Dallas Burtraw
- Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing pp. 58-77

- Andrea Shepard
- Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts pp. 78-100

- Douglas Allen and Dean Lueck
- Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities pp. 101-125

- James T. Hamilton
- The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement pp. 126-146

- Keith J. Crocker and Kenneth J. Reynolds
- Bilateral Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Collusion pp. 147-155

- William Neilson and Harold Winter
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