RAND Journal of Economics

1984 - 2005

Continuation of Bell Journal of Economics. Continued by RAND Journal of Economics.

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Volume 27, issue 4, 1996

Endogenous Leadership in a New Market pp. 641-659

Giovanni Maggi

Capacity, Entry, and Forward Induction pp. 660-680

Kyle Bagwell and Garey Ramey

An Experimental Examination of the Walrasian Tatonnement Mechanism pp. 681-699

Corinne Bronfman, Kevin McCabe, David Porter, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith

Bounding the Effects of R&D: An Investigation Using Matched Establishment-Firm Data pp. 700-721

James Adams and Adam Jaffe

Patent Policy and the Direction of Technological Change pp. 722-746

Mukesh Eswaran and Nancy Gallini

A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power pp. 747-769

Christopher Snyder

Treble Damages and the Incentive to Sue and Settle pp. 770-786

Hugh C. Briggs, Kathleen D. Huryn and Mark McBride

Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated Pretrial Negotiation pp. 787-802

Jeong-Yoo Kim

The Value of Information About Product Quality pp. 803-815

Edward Schlee

Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known pp. 819-847

Tracy Lewis

Volume 27, issue 3, 1996

Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets pp. 429-451

Severin Boreinstein and Andrea Shepard

Entry, Its Deterrence, and Its Accommodation: A Study of the U.S. Photographic Film Industry pp. 452-478

Vrinda Kadiyali

Agency Costs and the Limits of Integration pp. 479-501

Trond Olsen

R&D, Scope Economies, and Plant Performance pp. 502-522

Tor Klette

When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants to See pp. 523-541

Adam Brandenburger and Ben Polak

Do Consumers Search for the Highest Price? Oligopoly Equilibrium and Monopoly Optimum in Differentiated Products Markets pp. 542-562

Norbert Schulz and Konrad Stahl

Paying for Permanence: An Economic Analysis of EPA's Cleanup Decisions at Superfund Sites pp. 563-582

Shreekant Gupta, George Van Houtven and Maureen Cropper

Planned Obsolescence and the R&D Decision pp. 583-595

Michael Waldman

Market Regulation and Multimarket Rivalry pp. 596-617

Owen R. Phillips and Charles Mason

If OSHA Is So Bad, Why is Compliance So Good? pp. 618-640

David Weil

Volume 27, issue 2, 1996

On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitments by Monopolists pp. 207-220

Yongmin Chen and Robert Rosenthal

Why Market Shares Matter: An Information-Based Theory pp. 221-239

Ramon Caminal and Xavier Vives

International Price Discrimination in the European Car Market pp. 240-268

Frank Verboven

Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs pp. 269-280

A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Product Variety and Firm Agglomeration pp. 281-309

Jeffrey H. Fischer and Joseph Harrington

The Timing of Out-of-Court Settlements pp. 310-321

Gary Fournier and Thomas Zuehlke

Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products Be Patentable? pp. 322-331

Suzanne Scotchmer

Traffic-Based Cost Allocation in a Network pp. 332-345

Dominique Henriet and Herve Moulin

The Optimal Suppression of a Low-Cost Technology by a Durable-Good Monopoly pp. 346-364

Larry Karp and Jeffrey Perloff

Understanding the Supply Decisions of Nonprofits: Modelling the Location of Private Schools pp. 365-390

Thomas Downes and Shane Greenstein

Product Line Decisions and the Coase Conjecture pp. 391-414

Kai-Uwe Kuhn and A. Jorge Padilla

Death and Tobacco Taxes pp. 415-248

Michael J. Moore

Volume 27, issue 1, 1996

Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory pp. 1-19

David Martimort

Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of Research Productivity in Drug Discovery pp. 32-59

Rebecca Henderson and Iain Cockburn

Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations pp. 60-83

Carmen Matutes, Pierre Regibeau and Katharine Rockett

Strategic Nonparticipation pp. 84-98

Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu

Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery pp. 99-123

Jonathan Gruber and Maria Owings

Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids pp. 124-147

Mark Bagnoli and Barton Lipman

Consumer Product Safety Regulation in the United States and the United Kingdom: The Case of Bicycles pp. 148-164

Wesley A. Magat and Michael J. Moore

Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry pp. 165-182

Paul Joskow, Nancy Rose and Catherine Wolfram

New Evidence on Trends in Vehicle Emissions pp. 183-196

Matthew Kahn

Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution pp. 197-206

Keith N. Hylton

Volume 26, issue 4, 1995

Product and Process Flexibility in an Innovative Environment pp. 557-574

Susan Athey and Armin Schmutzler

Continuous Approximations in the Study of Hierarchies pp. 575-590

Timothy Van Zandt

Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships pp. 591-613

Martin Gaynor and Paul Gertler

Partnerships as Insurance Devices: Theory and Evidence pp. 614-629

Kevin Lang and Peter-John Gordon

Overt Interfunctional Conflict (and its Reduction Through Business Strategy) pp. 630-653

Julio Rotemberg and Garth Saloner

Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts pp. 654-672

Nahum D. Melumad, Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein

Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems pp. 675-689

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare

Costly Verification of Cost Performance and the Competition for Incentive Contracts pp. 690-703

Stephanie A. Dunne and Mark A. Loewenstein

Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation pp. 704-719

Mathias Dewatripont and Eric Maskin

Linearity with Project Selection and Controllable Diffusion Rate in Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems pp. 720-743

Jaeyoung Sung

Optimal Incentive Schemes When Only the Agents' "Best" Output Matters to the Principal pp. 744-760

Steven Levitt

Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts pp. 761-781

Sugato Bhattacharyya and Francine Lafontaine

Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Acquiring Firms pp. 782-793

Robert Hubbard and Darius Palia

Volume 26, issue 3, 1995

Optimal Capital Structure in Agency Relationships pp. 343-361

Tracy Lewis and David Sappington

Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation pp. 362-377

David Salant

Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion pp. 378-397

Yeon-Koo Che

Bid Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution pp. 398-417

Chantale LaCasse

Innovation and Natural Resources: A Dynamic Game with Uncertainty pp. 418-430

Christopher Harris and John Vickers

The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition pp. 431-451

Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz

A Comparison of Public Policies for Lead Recycling pp. 452-478

Hilary Sigman

Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Teller Machines pp. 479-501

Garth Saloner and Andrea Shepard

Electoral Support and the Capture of Legislators: Evidence from North Carolina's Vote on Radioactive Waste Disposal pp. 502-518

Dennis Coates

Testing for Employer Monopsony in Turn-of-the-Century Coal Mining pp. 519-536

William M. Boal

Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies pp. 537-556

Francis Bloch

Volume 26, issue 2, 1995

Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem pp. 163-179

Georg Nöldeke and Klaus Schmidt

On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation pp. 180-202

Kathryn E. Spier and Michael Whinston

Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court pp. 203-221

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum

An Economic Analysis of Scrappage pp. 222-242

Robert Hahn

Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis pp. 243-256

Richard Gilbert and Michael Riordan

On Productivity and Plant Ownership Change: New Evidence from the Longitudinal Research Database pp. 257-276

Robert H. McGuckin and Sang Nguyen

Managed Care as a Public Cost-Containment Mechanism pp. 277-295

Dana Goldman

Fault, Settlement, and Negligence Law pp. 296-313

Daniel Kessler

The Competitive Effects of Mergers: Stock Market Evidence from the U.S. Steel Dissolution Suit pp. 314-330

George L. Mullin, Joseph C. Mullin and Wallace P. Mullin

Buying Frenzies and Seller-Induced Excess Demand pp. 331-342

Patrick DeGraba

Volume 26, issue 1, 1995

Regulating a Dominant Firm: Unknown Demand and Industry Structure pp. 1-19

Gary Biglaiser and Ching-to Ma

On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation pp. 20-33

Jerry R. Green and Suzanne Scotchmer

Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation pp. 34-57

Howard F. Chang

Trade-ins and Introductory Offers in a Monopoly pp. 58-74

Ann van Ackere and Diane J. Reyniers

Testing for Imperfect Competition at the Fulton Fish Market pp. 75-92

Kathryn Graddy

Determinants of Participation in Accelerated Vehicle-Retirement Programs pp. 93-112

Anna Alberini, Winston Harrington and Virginia McConnell

Limit Qualities and Entry Deterrence pp. 113-130

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber

Antitrust and Higher Education: Was There a Conspiracy to Restrict Financial Aid? pp. 131-147

Dennis Carlton, Gustavo E. Bamberger and Roy Epstein

Competition Over Price and Service Rate When Demand is Stochastic: A Strategic Analysis pp. 148-162

Raymond Deneckere and James Peck