Levine's Working Paper Archive

From David K. Levine
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122247000000002381: Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs

Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson

122247000000002376: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining

Alvin Roth

122247000000002358: Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections

Alberto Alesina and Richard Holden

122247000000002352: Can News Be a Major Source of Aggregate Fluctuations? A Bayesian DSGE Approach

Ippei Fujiwara, Yasuo Hirose and Mototsugu Shintani

122247000000002346: Comparing Models of Strategic Thinking in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s Coordination Games

Miguel Costa-Gomes, Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri

122247000000002340: The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki

122247000000002336: Rationalization and Cognitive Dissonance: Do Choices Affect or Reflect Preferences?

Keith Chen

122247000000002330: Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles? Some Microeconomic Issues

John Conlon

122247000000002324: Confronting the Robinson Crusoe paradigm with household-size heterogeneity

Christos Koulovatianos, Carsten Schröder and Ulrich Schmidt

122247000000002317: Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

122247000000002312: The Relationship Between Classical and Quantum Correlation in Games

Adam Brandenburger

122247000000002307: Repeated Relationships with Limits on Information Processing

Olivier Compte and Andrew Postlewaite

122247000000002301: Job Market Signalling and Job Search

Andriy Zapechelnyuk and Ro'i Zultan

122247000000002297: The sure-thing principle and independence of irrelevant knowledge

Dov Samet

122247000000002291: Affective Decision Making and the Ellsberg Paradox

Anat Bracha and Donald Brown

122247000000002286: Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

122247000000002281: New York City Cabdrivers’ Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income

Vincent Crawford and Juanjuan Meng

122247000000002276: Prejudice and Immigration

Paolo Giordani and Michele Ruta

122247000000002269: Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source Industries

Michele Boldrin and David Levine

122247000000002262: Appropriation and Intellectual Property

Michele Boldrin and David Levine

122247000000002258: Essays in Aggregate Information, The Media and Special Interests

Zacharias Maniadis

122247000000002254: Essays on Political Economy

Paulo Melo-Filho

122247000000002250: Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics

Guillermo Ordonez

122247000000002243: Essays in Applied Theory

Viola Chen

122247000000002236: Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships

Ichiro Obara and David Rahman

122247000000002230: Reforming Social Security with Progressive Personal Accounts

John Geanakoplos and Stephen Zeldes

122247000000002225: Overlapping Generations Models of General Equilibrium

John Geanakoplos

122247000000002219: Pareto Improving Taxes

John Geanakoplos and H M Polemchakis

122247000000002215: Bayesian games: games of incomplete information

Shmuel Zamir

122247000000002211: Economics and Common Sense

Gil Kalai

122247000000002205: Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Form Games

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

122247000000002199: Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling

Andriy Zapechelnyuk and Ro'i Zultan

122247000000002192: Political Economy of Ramsey Taxation

Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov and Aleh Tsyvinski

122247000000002185: Measurable Ambiguity

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer

122247000000002180: Bubbles and Crashes with Partially Sophisticated Investors

Milo Bianchi and Philippe Jehiel

122247000000002175: Optimal Insurance with Adverse Selection

Hector Chade and Edward Schlee

122247000000002167: Quality, Upgrades, and (the Loss of) Market Power in a Dynamic Monopoly Model

James Anton and Gary Biglaiser

122247000000002161: Revealed Conflicting Preferences

Attila Ambrus and Kareen Rozen

122247000000002153: Strong Bubbles and Common Expected Bubbles in a Finite Horizon Model

Jie Zheng

122247000000002142: Overconfidence?

Jean Pierre Benoit and Juan Dubra

122247000000002137: Advertising, Entry Deterrence, and Industry Innovation

Shi Qi

122247000000002121: Elections Can be Manipulated Often

Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai and Noam Nisan

122247000000002115: Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case

Bezalel Peleg and Shmuel Zamir

122247000000002108: Strategy-proofness vs. Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redisigning the NYC High School Match

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak and Alvin Roth

122247000000002102: Moderating Political Extremism: Single vs. Dual Ballot Elections

Massimo Bordignon and Guido Tabellini

122247000000002091: Can a Preferential Trade Agreement Benefit Neighbor Countries without Compensating Them?

Masahiro Endoh, Koichi Hamada and Koji Shimomura

122247000000002086: Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining

Kareen Rozen

122247000000002080: A ‘Dual’-Improved Shortcut to the Long Run

Kareen Rozen

122247000000002074: Emerging Markets in an Anxious Global Economy

Ana Fostel and John Geanakoplos

122247000000002067: The Virtues and Vices of Equilibrium and the Future of Financial Economics

J. Farmer and John Geanakoplos