Levine's Working Paper Archive
From David K. Levine
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David K. Levine ().
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- 2080: Risk Sharing and Market Incompleteness

- David Levine and William Zame
- 2077: Income Fluctuations and Asymmetric Information: An Example of the Repeated Principal Agent Problem

- Jonathan Thomas and Timothy Worrall
- 2070: A Law of Large Numbers for Large Economies

- Harald Uhlig
- 2069: Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

- Edward Prescott and Robert Townsend
- 2068: The Castle on the Hill

- David Levine
- 2065: Learning by Doing and the Choice of Technology

- Larry Karp and In Ho Lee
- 2064: Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets

- Cheng Wang
- 2062: Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information

- Alberto Bisin and Piero Gottardi
- 2061: Indivisibilities, Lotteries and Sunspot Equilibria

- Karl Shell and Randall Wright
- 2060: Strategy and Equity: An ERC Analysis of the Guth-van Damme Game

- Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
- 2059: An Easier Way to Calibrate

- Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- 2058: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

- Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Eric Maskin
- 2057: Gross Substitutes in Large Square Economics

- Timothy Kehoe, David Levine, Andreu Mas-Colell and Michael Woodford
- 2055: The Monetary Transmission Mechanism

- Jess Benhabib and Roger Farmer
- 2054: Randomization with Asymmetric Information

- Richard Arnott and Joseph Stiglitz
- 2053: Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing Without Commitment

- Narayana Kocherlakota
- 2049: social Norms, Local Interaction and Neighborhood Planning

- Matthew Haag and Roger Lagunoff
- 2048: Comment: General competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information

- Hal L Cole
- 2047: Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments

- David Levine
- 2042: Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models

- Timothy Kehoe and David Levine
- 2035: The Optimum Quantity of Money Revisited

- Timothy Kehoe, David Levine and Michael Woodford
- 2031: Game theory models for exchange Networks: experimental results

- E. J. Bienenstock and P. Bonacich
- 2028: Growth Cycles and Market Crashes

- Michele Boldrin and David Levine
- 2022: Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game

- David Levine
- 2015: Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent

- Marco Celentani, Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
- 2010: Exclusion and Power: a Test of Four Theories of Power in Exchange Networks

- John Skvoretz and David Willer
- 2006: On the Long Run Implications of Repeated Moral Hazard

- Christopher Phelan
- 2005: The Financial Sector in the Planning of Economic Development

- David Backus, Herminio Blanco and David Levine
- 1997: Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models

- David Levine
- 1996: Perfectly Competitive Innovation

- Michele Boldrin and David Levine
- 1987: Reputation with Noisy Precommitment

- David Levine and Cesar Martinelli
- 1980: Welfare Effects of Bankruptcy

- Tarun Sabarwal
- 1974: Lotteries, Sunspots and Incentive Constraints

- Timothy Kehoe, David Levine and Edward Prescott
- 1954: Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets

- David Levine and William Zame
- 1953: Ex Ante Randomization in Agency Models

- J C Fellingham, Y K Kwon and D P Newman
- 1909: Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage

- Harold Cole and Narayana Kocherlakota
- 1908: On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets

- Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz
- 1898: Asset Pricing When Risk Sharing is Limited by Default

- Fernando Alvarez and Urban Jermann
- 1889: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition

- Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
- 1873: Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies

- Timothy Kehoe and David Levine
- 1833: The Equity Premium Puzzle and the Risk-Free Rate Puzzle

- Phillippe Weil
- 1718: Learning in High stakes utlimatum and market games. An experiment in the Slovak Republic

- Robert Slonim and Alvin Roth
- 1639: Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma

- Ariel Rubinstein
- 1631: The rule of information in bargaining: an experimental study

- Alvin Roth and John Murnighan
- 1629: Toward a theory of bargaining: an experimental study in economics

- Alvin Roth
- 1594: Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices

- Roy Radner
- 1578: General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information

- Edward Prescott and Robert Townsend
- 1560: Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

- Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
- 1544: Altruism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments

- Thomas Palfrey and Jeffrey E Prisbrey
- 1493: Risk Aversion and Bargaining: Some Preliminary Results

- John Murnighan, Alvin Roth and Francoise Schoumaker