Levine's Working Paper Archive

From David K. Levine
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David K. Levine ().

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567: Universal Prediction of Individual Sequences

M. Feder, N. Mehrav and M. Gutman

566: Learning Probabilistic Prediction Functions

A. Desantis, G. Markowski and M. Wegman

565: Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information

D. Blackwell and L. Dubins

564: Approximate Methods for Sequential Decision Making Using Expert Advice

T.H. Chung

563: Learning Processes, Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Repeated Games

M. Benaim and M. W. Hirsch

562: Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of a Normal Form Game

Masaki Aoyagi

561: Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata

K. Binmore and L. Samuelson

560: Decision-making behavior in two-choice uncertain outcome situations

S. Siegel and D A Goldstein

559: Decision-making behavior in two-choice uncertain outcome situations

S. Siegel and D. A. Goldstein

553: Probability Learning in 1000 Trials

W. Edwards

550: Using genetic algorithms to model the evolution of heterogenous beliefs

James Bullard and John Duffy

548: On the Evolution of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games

John van Huyck, Raymond Battalio and F. Rankin

546: Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin

544: Strategic Information Transmission

Vincent Crawford and J. Sobel

543: Evolutionary Stability in Unanimity Games with Cheap Talk

Karl Wärneryd

542: On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Dale Stahl and Paul Wilson

541: Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics

Karl Schlag

540: Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake

Arthur Robson

539: Communication Between Rational Agents

Matthew Rabin

538: An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction

Georg Nöldeke and L. Samuelson

537: Refinement of the Nash Equilibrium Concept

Roger Myerson

536: Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society

A. Matsui

535: Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices

J.C. Gittens

534: Social Stability and Equilibrium

Itzhak Gilboa and A. Matsui

533: Meaning and Credibility in Cheap Talk Games

Joseph Farrell

532: On the Uniform Consistency of Bayes Estimates with Multinomial Probabilities

P. Diaconis and D. Freedman

530: Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication

Andreas Blume, Y. G. Kim and J. Sobel

529: Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium

Ehud Kalai and E. Lehrer

526: Exercises in Conjectural Equilibrium

Frank Hahn

523: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection

D. Pearce

521: An experimental study of the centipede game

Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey

518: Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg and David Kreps

516: An Approach to Communication Equilibrium

Francoise Forges

514: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior

B. Douglas Bernheim

512: Agreeing to Disagree

Robert Aumann

511: Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics

Matthew Rabin

510: Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games

R. McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey

509: Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research

John Ledyard

508: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

505: p-dominance and Belief Potential

Stephen Morris, R. Rob and Hyun Song Shin

503: Equilibrium Selection in n-person Coordination Games

Y. Kim

502: Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications

Michihiro Kandori and R. Rob

501: Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice

Michihiro Kandori and R. Rob

500: Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games

Michihiro Kandori, George Mailath and R. Rob

497: Invariant Distributions and the Limiting Behavior of Markovian Economic Models

Carl Futia

496: Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks

Drew Fudenberg and C. Harris

494: Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run

H. Young and Dean Foster

493: Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics

Dean Foster and P. Young

492: Local Conventions

Jeffrey Ely

491: Basins of Attraction and Long-Run Equilibria

Glenn Ellison