Levine's Working Paper Archive

From David K. Levine
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David K. Levine ().

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487: Musical Chairs: Modelling Noisy Evolution

K. Binmore, L. Samuelson and K. Vaughn

486: Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations

James Bergin and Barton Lipman

485: The Evolution of Conventions

P. Young

484: A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games

Chris Sanchirico

483: Non-convergence to unstable points in urn models and stochastic approximations

R. Pemantle

481: Learning Automata: a Survey

K. Narendra and M. Thatcher

480: On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Played with Non-Bayesian Players

Nimrod Megiddo

476: Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations

Y. Kanivokski and P. Young

475: Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Equilibria

James Jordan

474: Learning by Forgetful Players: From Primitive Formations to Persistent Retracts

Sjaak Hurkens

471: Conditional Universal Consistency

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

470: Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

469: Synchronous and Asynchronous Learning by Responsive Learning Automata

E. Friedman and S. Shenker

468: Asymptotic Calibration

D. Foster and R. Vohra

466: An Analog of the Minmax Theorem for Vector Payoffs

D. Blackwell

465: Controlled Random Walks

D. Blackwell

464: Learning Processes, Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Repeated Games

M. Benaim and M. W. Hirsch

463: On Pseudo-Games

A. Banos

462: Gambling in a rigged casino: The adversarial multi-armed bandit problem

P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Y. Freund and R. Schapire

458: Psychophysical Analysis

L. Thurstone

457: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics

P. Taylor and L. Jonker

456: Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games

Jeroen Swinkels

455: Coyness, Philandering and Stable Strategies

Schuster and K. Sigmund

454: Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution

Karl Schlag

453: Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games

L. Samuelson and J. Zhang

452: Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games

Klaus Ritzberger and Jörgen Weibull

451: Considerations of fairness and strategy: experimental data from sequential games

V. Prasnikar and Alvin Roth

449: Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complements

Paul Milgrom and John Roberts

448: The Theory of Games and Evolution of Animal Conflicts

J. Maynard Smith

447: Models of Integration Given Multiple Sources of Information

D. Massaro and Daniel Friedman

445: On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

E. Kohlberg and Jean-François Mertens

444: Evolutionary Selection against dominated strategies

Josef Hofbauer and Jörgen Weibull

441: A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics

Josef Hofbauer, P. Schuster and K. Sigmund

440: Evolutionary Dynamics for Bimatrix Games: A Hamiltonian system?

Josef Hofbauer

438: Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons and the Replicator Equation

A. Gaunersdorfer and Josef Hofbauer

437: Coevolutionary instability of mixed Nash solutions

I. Eshel and E. Akin

435: Rules of Thumb for Social Learning

Glenn Ellison and Drew Fudenberg

434: On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior

Eddie Dekel and Suzanne Scotchmer

432: On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics

Antonio Cabrales and Joel Sobel

430: Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation

R. Boylan

426: Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection

Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson

425: Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning

Abhijit Banerjee and Drew Fudenberg

424: Evolutionary Dynamics of zero-sum games

E. Akin and V. Losert

422: An Iterative Method of Solving a Game

J. Robinson

420: Belief Affirming in Learning Processes

Dov Monderer, Dov Samet and Aner Sela

419: On the Convergence of Learning Processes in a 2x2 Non-Zero-Person Game

K. Miyasawa

418: Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal-Form Games

Paul Milgrom and John Roberts

417: On the Convergence of Fictitious Play

Vijay Krishna and Tomas Sjostrom

415: Learning Mixed Equilibria

Drew Fudenberg and David Kreps

413: Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia

Glenn Ellison