Levine's Working Paper Archive

From David K. Levine
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407: Fictitious Play By Cases

M. Li Calzi

404: Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games

Vincent Crawford

403: Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments

R. Boylan and Mahmoud El-Gamal

402: Computing Equilibria of n-person Games

Robert Wilson

401: Evolution of Smart n Players

Dale Stahl

400: Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Theory

B. Skyrms

397: A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, 1: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs

Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole

394: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Eric Maskin

393: Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results

Dan Friedman

392: Evolutionary Games in Economics

Dan Friedman

391: Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination

Glenn Ellison

390: Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection

Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson

389: Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies

Robert Aumann

387: Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Run

Alvin Roth and I. Er’ev

386: Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information

Philip Reny

382: Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg and David Kreps

381: Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations

Tilman Börgers and R. Sarin

380: Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics

Tilman Börgers and R. Sarin

379: Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty

Eddie Dekel and Drew Fudenberg

378: Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge

Tilman Börgers

375: Strategic Irrationality in Extensive Games

Kaushik Basu

374: An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication

Y. G. Kim and J. Sobel

373: Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

372: Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals

R. Boylan

370: Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

369: Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability

Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky

344: Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study

Alvin Roth, V. Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Shmuel Zamir

331: An experimental study of sequential bargaining

J. Ochs and Alvin Roth

310: Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism

R. Isaac and James Walker

299: An experimental evaluation of weakest link/best shot models of public goods

Glenn Harrison and Jack Hirshleifer

295: Ultimatum bargaining behavior: a survey and comparison of results

W. Guth and R. Tietz

291: An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining

W. Guth, R. Schmittberger and B. Schwartz

268: Do biases in probability judgement matter in markets: experimental evidence

Colin Camerer

263: A comparative model of bargaining: theory and evidence

Gary Bolton

255: A Multi-stage Model of Bargaining

Joel Sobel and Takahashi

252: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

Ariel Rubinstein

250: Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium

Richard Rogerson

245: Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis

Paul Milgrom and John Roberts

240: Convergence of Least Squares Learning in Environments With Private Information

Albert Marcet and Thomas Sargent

239: Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

David Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Bob Wilson

238: Reputation and Imperfect Information

David Kreps and Robert Wilson

237: Sequential Equilibria

David Kreps and Robert Wilson

234: Learning Rational Expectations: The Finite State Case

James Jordan

233: Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle

Gary Hansen

232: Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture

Faruk Gul, Hugo Sonnenschein and Robert Wilson

230: A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information and Learning by Doing

Sandy Grossman

229: Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities

Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Jean Tirole

227: On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements

Drew Fudenberg, David Kreps and David Levine

224: The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information

Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin

221: Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine