Levine's Working Paper Archive

From David K. Levine
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David K. Levine ().

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632: Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect monitoring

Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

631: Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching

Glenn Ellison

630: Social Norms and Community Enforcement

Michihiro Kandori

629: Learning in the Stock Flow Model

David Levine

628: Notes on Discrete Dynamic Programming

David Levine

627: Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

626: Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests

Klaus Schmidt

625: Inflation and Reputation

David Backus and J. Driffil

624: The Theory of Learning in Games

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

623: Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining

Arial Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky

622: Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome

Arial Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky

621: Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining

Douglas Gale

618: Repeated Principal Agent Games With Discounting

Roy Radner

617: Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship

Roy Radner

608: Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players

Drew Fudenberg, David Kreps and Eric Maskin

607: An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

605: Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game

Klaus Schmidt

604: Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents

Drew Fudenberg and David Kreps

603: Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

602: Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets

Douglas Diamond

600: Sustainable Plans

Varadarajan Chari and Patrick Kehoe

599: The Evolution of Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

John Nachbar

598: Loss of Commitment? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell’s Example

Jörg Oechssler and Karl Schlag

597: Learning to Perfect Manipulation: Implications for Fertility, Savings, and Old-Age Social Security

Lakshmi Raut

596: Robust Permanent Income and Pricing

Lars Hansen, Thomas Sargent and Thomas Tallarini

595: Learning and Implementation on the Internet

Eric J Friedman and Scott Schenker

594: Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Heterogeneous Receivers

Jeffrey E Prisbey

593: Game Theory, On-line Prediction and Boosting

Yoav Freund and Robert E Shapire

592: Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study

John Duffy and Nick Feltovich

591: A proof of Calibration via Blackwell's Approachability Theorem

Dean Foster

590: Predicting a binary sequence almost as well as the optimal biased coin

Yoav Freund

588: Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in markets

Tony Curson Price

587: Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality

John Geanakoplos, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

584: Calibrated Forecasting and Merging

Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer and Rann Smorodinsky

583: A 2 ×2 Game without the Fictitious Play Property

Dov Monderer and Aner Sela

582: On 'Reputation' Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs

Joel Watson and Pierpaolo Battigalli

580: A ‘Reputation’ Refinement without Equilibrium

Joel Watson

578: Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition and Nash Equilibrium

Doron Sonsino

576: Prediction, Optimization and Learning in Repeated Games

John Nachbar

575: The Weighted Majority Algorithm

N. Littlestone and M. Warmuth

574: Using Experts for Predicting Continuous Outcomes

J. Kivinen and M. Warmuth

573: Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games

James Jordan

572: A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium

Sergiu Hart and A. Mas-Collel

571: Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

570: A Decision Theoretic Generalization of On-Line Learning and an Application to Boosting

Y. Freund and R. Schapire

569: Regret in the On-line Decision Problem

D. Foster and R. Vohra

568: Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium

D. Foster and R. Vohra

567: Universal Prediction of Individual Sequences

M. Feder, N. Mehrav and M. Gutman

566: Learning Probabilistic Prediction Functions

A. Desantis, G. Markowski and M. Wegman

565: Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information

D. Blackwell and L. Dubins