Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects

Bruno Jullien, Alessandro Pavan and Marc Rysman

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Abstract: The chapter has 9 sections, covering the theory of two-sided markets and related empirical work. Section 1 introduces the reader to the literature. Section 2 covers the case of markets dominated by a single monopolistic rm. Section 3 discusses the theoretical literature on competition for the market, focusing on pricing strategies that rms may follow to prevent entry. Section 4 discusses pricing in markets in which multiple platforms are active and serve both sides. Section 5 presents alternative models of platform competition. Section 6 discusses richer matching protocols whereby platforms pricediscriminate by granting access only to a subset of the participating agents from the other side and discusses the related literature on matching design. Section 7 discusses identication in empirical work. Section 8 discusses estimation in empirical work. Finally, Section 9 concludes.

Keywords: Two-sided market; Platform; Pricing; Network effects; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03629451
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Related works:
Working Paper: Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects (2021)
Working Paper: Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects (2021)
Working Paper: Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects (2021)
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