Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects
Alessandro Pavan,
Bruno Jullien and
Marc Rysman
No 16480, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
The chapter has 9 sections, covering the theory of two-sided markets and related empirical work. Section 1 introduces the reader to the literature. Section 2 covers the case of markets dominated by a single monopolistic firm. Section 3 discusses the theoretical literature on competition for the market, focusing on pricing strategies that firms may follow to prevent entry. Section 4 discusses pricing in markets in which multiple platforms are active and serve both sides. Section 5 presents alternative models of platform competition. Section 6 discusses richer matching protocols whereby platforms price- discriminate by granting access only to a subset of the participating agents from the other side and discusses the related literature on matching design. Section 7 discusses identification in empirical work. Section 8 discusses estimation in empirical work. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
Keywords: Two-sided market; Platform; Pricing; Network effects; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-08
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Working Paper: Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects (2022) 
Working Paper: Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects (2021)
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