Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects
Alessandro Pavan and
Marc Rysman ()
No 21-1238, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
The chapter has 9 sections, covering the theory of two-sided markets and related empirical work. Section 1 introduces the reader to the literature. Section 2 covers the case of markets dominated by a single monopolistic rm. Section 3 discusses the theoretical literature on competition for the market, focusing on pricing strategies that rms may follow to prevent entry. Section 4 discusses pricing in markets in which multiple platforms are active and serve both sides. Section 5 presents alternative models of platform competition. Section 6 discusses richer matching protocols whereby platforms pricediscriminate by granting access only to a subset of the participating agents from the other side and discusses the related literature on matching design. Section 7 discusses identication in empirical work. Section 8 discusses estimation in empirical work. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
Keywords: Two-sided market; platform; pricing; network effects; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-isf, nep-pay and nep-reg
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Working Paper: Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects (2022)
Working Paper: Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects (2021)
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