Relational communication

Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li ()
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Hongyi Li: School of Economics, UNSW Business School

Theoretical Economics, 2021, vol. 16, issue 4

Abstract: We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver's decision-making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver's decision-making is disciplined by pooling states where she is most tempted to defect.

Keywords: Strategic communication; relational contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2020)
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2020)
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2019)
Working Paper: Relational Communication (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:3734

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