Economics and Politics

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): Peter Rosendorff

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Political Influence of Firms in the Tradables and Non‐Tradables Sectors: A Cross‐Country Analysis pp. 297-312: Mahmut Yasar, Roderick Rejesus, Yanjing Chen and Ujjayant Chakravorty
Protection with many sellers: An Application to Legislatures with Malapportionment pp. 313-344: William Hauk
Leader Survival and Cabinet Change pp. 345-366: Alejandro Quiroz Flores and Alastair Smith

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AFTER THE COLD WAR pp. 153-171: Joanne Gowa
DEMOCRACY AND DE FACTO EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES pp. 172-194: David H. Bearce and Mark Hallerberg
LEGAL CORRUPTION pp. 195-219: Daniel Kaufmann and Pedro Vicente
WHY REWARDS ARE BETTER THAN SANCTIONS pp. 220-238: Daniel Verdier and Byungwon Woo
WAGE SUBSIDY AND WELFARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES pp. 239-253: Hamid Beladi and Saibal Kar
TARIFFS AND IMPORTS MISINVOICING UNDER OLIGOPOLY pp. 254-270: Amit K. Biswas and Sarbajit Sengupta
MODELS OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE PROVISION OF GOODS pp. 271-296: Paolo Balduzzi

SPECIAL INTERESTS AND FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE CASE OF MEXICO pp. 1-35: Sergey Mityakov
SEQUENTIAL VOTING WHEN LONG ELECTIONS ARE COSTLY pp. 36-58: Patrick Hummel
CIVIL WAR EXPOSURE AND VIOLENCE pp. 59-73: Edward Miguel, Sebastián M. Saiegh and Shanker Satyanath
INTERTEMPORAL COMPETITION AND AID pp. 74-87: Ehtisham Ahmad and Leonardo Martinez
POLITICAL ASYMMETRY AND COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFFS IN A CUSTOMS UNION pp. 88-106: Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Sajal Lahiri and Suryadipta Roy
THE VANISHING BEQUEST TAX: THE COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF BEQUEST TAXATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE pp. 107-131: Graziella Bertocchi
RACIAL REDISTRICTING FOR MINORITY REPRESENTATION WITHOUT PARTISAN BIAS: A THEORETICAL APPROACH pp. 132-151: Keisuke Nakao

FIRM‐LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE pp. 233-256: Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein
DO STOCK RETURNS VARY WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS? BUSH VS. GORE: THE FLORIDA RECOUNT pp. 257-281: John J. Shon
CAFTA, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL INTERESTS pp. 282-297: James DeVault
POLITICAL SELECTION OF FIRMS INTO PRIVATIZATION PROGRAMS. EVIDENCE FROM ROMANIAN COMPREHENSIVE DATA pp. 298-328: Ádám Szentpéteri and Almos Telegdy
TURNOVER IN POWER AS A RESTRAINT ON INVESTING IN INFLUENCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE POSTCOMMUNIST TRANSITION pp. 329-361: Branko Milanovic, Karla Hoff and Shale Horowitz
BREAKING THE IMPEDIMENTS TO BUDGETARY REFORMS: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE pp. 362-391: Stefania Fabrizio and Ashoka Mody
MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES pp. 392-418: Thomas Sattler and Stefanie Walter
INVESTING IN INSTITUTIONS pp. 419-445: Ryan Compton, Daniel Giedeman and Noel Johnson
ELECTORAL CYCLES THROUGH LOBBYING pp. 446-470: Marco Bonomo and Cristina Terra
RESOURCE CURSE, POLITICAL ENTRY, AND DEADWEIGHT COSTS pp. 471-497: Kevin Tsui
RATE‐CUTTING TAX REFORMS AND CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION IN EUROPE pp. 498-518: Friedrich Heinemann, Michael Overesch and Johannes Rincke

OPTIMAL SETS OF CANDIDATES pp. 127-150: Johannes Fedderke
RATIONAL PARTISAN THEORY, UNCERTAINTY, AND SPATIAL VOTING: EVIDENCE FOR THE BANK OF ENGLAND'S MPC pp. 151-179: Arnab Bhattacharjee and Sean Holly
ESTIMATING INCUMBENCY EFFECTS IN U.S. STATE LEGISLATURES: A QUASI‐EXPERIMENTAL STUDY pp. 180-199: Yogesh Uppal
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN LEGISLATORS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AID pp. 200-232: Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL PRUDENCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE pp. 1-36: Mark Dincecco
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SEVEN FEDERATIONS pp. 37-67: Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels
FISCAL FEDERALISM, STATE LOBBYING AND DISCRETIONARY FINANCE: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA pp. 68-91: Rongili Biswas, Sugata Marjit and Velayoudom Marimoutou
GLOBAL AND DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL RISKS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT pp. 92-125: Rodolphe Desbordes

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND CONFLICTS ON GROWTH IN ASIA pp. 359-383: Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler
DETERRENCE: CREDIBILITY AND PROPORTIONALITY pp. 384-408: Daniel Arce and Todd Sandler
TERRORISM AND THE RETURNS TO OIL pp. 409-432: Stephen Blomberg, Gregory Hess and J. Hunter Jackson
THE IMPACT OF SOCIETAL RISK ATTITUDES ON TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM pp. 433-451: Paan Jindapon and William Neilson

CORRUPTION AND ELECTIONS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOR A CROSS‐SECTION OF COUNTRIES pp. 179-200: Stefan Krause Montalbert and Fabio Mendez
HOW DO POLICY‐MAKERS ACTUALLY SOLVE PROBLEMS? EVIDENCE FROM THE FRENCH LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR pp. 201-231: Benoît Le Maux
COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES pp. 232-254: Sebastian M. Saiegh
POLITICAL PREDATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT pp. 255-277: Jean-Paul Azam, Robert Bates and Bruno Biais
A PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN MAJORITARIAN POLITICS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION pp. 278-307: Carolyn Evans
WHY DO UNDERGROUND REDUCING POLICIES OFTEN FAIL THEIR SCOPE? SOME ANSWERS FROM THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE pp. 308-318: Bruno Chiarini, Marco Di Domizio and Elisabetta Marzano
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES NOW AND BENEFITS TOMORROW: HOW SOON IS TOMORROW? pp. 319-357: Pierre-Guillaume Méon, Khalid Sekkat and Laurent Weill

LOBBYING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION pp. 1-41: Bilgehan Karabay
INSTABILITY AND THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION pp. 42-92: Filipe Campante, Davin Chor and Quoc-Anh Do
THE LOGIC OF AUTHORITARIAN BARGAINS pp. 93-125: Raj Desai, Anders Olofsgård and Tarik M. Yousef
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: A LOAN MECHANISM‐DESIGN APPROACH pp. 126-158: Alex Mourmouras and Wolfgang Mayer
THE STRATEGIC TIMING OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY pp. 159-177: Marc Meredith