Economics and Politics

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): Peter Rosendorff

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Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a “Liberal” Central Banker pp. 221-236: Johan Lagerlof
Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina pp. 237-256: Alberto Porto and Pablo Sanguinetti
Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies pp. 257-279: Rigoberto Lopez
The ratification of ILO conventions: A hazard rate analysis pp. 281-309: Bernhard Boockmann
Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality pp. 311-342: Ugo

Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes pp. 113-128: Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger
Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom pp. 129-157: Allan Drazen and William Easterly
Political Competition in Weak States pp. 159-184: Eliana La Ferrara and Robert Bates
A Model of Inequality and Interest Group Politics pp. 185-200: Inderjit Kohli and Nirvikar Singh
The Political Economy of the IRS pp. 201-220: Marilyn Young, Michael Reksulak and William Shughart

Choosing Democracy pp. 1-29: B. Rosendorff
Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union pp. 31-47: Dmitriy Gershenson and Herschel Grossman
A Visible Hand? Bond Markets, Political Parties, Balanced Budget Laws, and State Government Debt pp. 49-72: Robert C. Lowry
Why Do Policy Makers Give (Permanent) Power to Policy Advisers? pp. 73-94: Otto Swank and Robert Dur
Why Do Poor democracies Collect a Lot of Tariff Revenue? pp. 95-112: Thomas Moutos

Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance pp. 225-245: Paul Collier
Interest Group Lobbying and the Delegation of Policy Authority pp. 247-274: Randolph Sloof
Delays of Inflation Stabilizations pp. 275-295: Francisco Veiga
Information and Common Knowledge in Collective Action pp. 297-319: Arieh Gavious and Shlomo Mizrahi
Who gets the goods? Moderate Voting Records, Diminishing Returns, and PAC Contributions pp. 321-333: Gregory m. Dempster and Christopher Westley

Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information pp. 109-135: John Duggan
Activist Macroeconomic Policy, Election Effects and the Formation of Expectations: Evidence from OECD Economies pp. 137-154: David Kiefer
Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth pp. 155-182: Hongyi Li, Lixin Xu and Heng-Fu Zou
Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model and New Evidence on Coups D'État pp. 183-204: Alexander Galetovic and Ricardo Sanhueza
A Game‐Theoretic Model Of The CouP D'État pp. 205-223: Daniel Sutter

The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth pp. 1-31: Witold Henisz
On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion pp. 33-51: Devashish Mitra
Macroeconomics and Politics Revisited: Do central banks Matter? pp. 53-67: M. Lossani, Piergiovanna Natale and Patrizio Tirelli
Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth pp. 69-81: Alberto Chong and Cesar Calderon
What is Vulnerable During Fiscal Retrenchment? pp. 83-108: M. Fardmanesh and Nader Habibi

Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub‐Saharan Africa pp. 225-253: Christopher Adam and S. A. O’Connell
Election Surprises and Exchange Rate Uncertainty pp. 255-274: Michelle Garfinkel, Amihai Glazer and Jaewoo Lee
Aid, Growth and Democracy pp. 275-297: Jakob Svensson
Central Bank Independence and Private Investment in the Developing World pp. 299-309: M. Pastor, Jr and S. Maxfield
Rational Abstention and the Congressional Vote Choice pp. 311-340: L. S. Rothenberg and M. Sanders

Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments? pp. 109-144: Robert Staiger and Guido Tabellini
Russia’s Tax Crisis: Explaining Falling Revenues in a Transitional Economy pp. 145-169: D. Reisman
Does Distributional Skewness Lead to Redistribution? Evidence from the United States pp. 171-199: F. C. Rodrigìuez
The Politics of Index‐Linked Bonds pp. 201-212: L. Pecchi and Gustavo Piga
New Deal or Same Old Shuffle? The Distribution of New Deal Dollars Across Alabama pp. 213-223: J. F. Couch and P. M. Williams

Foreign Investment and Endogenous Protection with Protectionist Quid Pro Quo pp. 1-12: Arye Hillman and Heinrich Ursprung
Rational Partisan Theory: Evidence for Seven OECD Economies pp. 13-32: Fredrik Carlsen and Elin F. Pedersen
Estimating Presidential Elections: The Importance of State Fixed Effects and the Role of National Versus Local Information pp. 33-50: Koleman S. Strumpf and John R. Phillippe
Measurement of Political Effects in the United States Economy: A Study of the 1992 Presidential Election pp. 51-81: Michael C. Herron, James Lavin, Donald Cram and Jay Silver
Campaign Contributions and the Desirability of Full Disclosure Laws pp. 83-107: Randolph Sloof

Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three‐way, Experimental Elections pp. 185-218: T. Reitz, Roger Myerson and Robert Weber
Twenty‐five Years after Kramer: An Assessment of Economic Retrospective Voting based upon Improved Estimates of Income and Unemployment pp. 219-248: D. R. Kiewiet and M. Udell
Economic Performance and Leadership Accountability: An Econometric Analysis pp. 249-296: Maria Gallego
Employment and Gubernatorial Elections during the Gilded Age pp. 297-309: Jac Heckelman
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Anticipated Price Reform pp. 311-331: John Fender and D. Laing

Searching for the Downsian Voter with a Simple Structural Model pp. 107-126: Darren Grant
Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange pp. 127-142: Per Lundborg
Interests Versus Ideology in the Ratification of the 16th and 17th Amendments pp. 143-160: Randall Holcombe and D. J. Lacombe
To Shock or Not to Shock? Economics and Political Economy of Large‐Scale Reforms pp. 161-183: P. Lian and Shang-Jin Wei

Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle: A Workhorse Model pp. 1-17: Susanne Lohmann
Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters? pp. 19-35: Steven Levitt
Retests on the Theory of Collective Action: The Olson and Zeckhauser Model and its Elaboration pp. 37-62: Gi‐Heon Kwon
Political Control of Administrative Spending: The Case of Local Governments in Norway pp. 63-83: Jorid Kalseth and Jorn Rattso
Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections pp. 85-103: Wilko Letterie and Otto Swank