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Economics and Politics

1989 - 2022

Current editor(s): Peter Rosendorff

From Wiley Blackwell
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Volume 6, issue 3, 1994

SCHATTSCHNEIDER REVISITED: SENATE VOTING ON THE SMOOT‐HAWLEY TARIFF ACT OF 1930 pp. 187-199 Downloads
Richard T. Cupitt and Euel Elliott
SAFE SEATS, MARGINAL SEATS, AND PARTY PLATFORMS: THE LOGIC OF PLATFORM DIFFERENTIATION* pp. 201-213 Downloads
James Snyder
ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY: A TIME‐SERIES APPROACH* pp. 215-232 Downloads
Martin Rama
WORDS AND DEEDS: SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE pp. 233-255 Downloads
Jim Granato and William West
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT, FINANCIAL ADAPTATION AND DELAYED STABILIZATIONS pp. 257-276 Downloads
Raúl Labán and Federico Sturzenegger

Volume 6, issue 2, 1994

TRADE POLICY AND INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: A SYNTHESIS OF RECENT WORK† pp. 97-118 Downloads
Michael P. Leidy
VOTING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WHEN LABOR SUPPLY IS ENDOGENOUS† pp. 119-130 Downloads
Friedrich Breyer
RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* pp. 131-145 Downloads
Tyler Cowen, Amihai Glazer and Henry McMillan
WINNER‐HELP‐LOSER GROUP FORMATION IN RENT‐SEEKING CONTESTS* pp. 147-162 Downloads
Kyung Baik
DIMENSIONAL SIMPLIFICATION AND ECONOMIC THEORIES OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR pp. 163-172 Downloads
Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal
WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS FROM DIMENSIONAL STUDIES OF ROLL‐CALL VOTING? pp. 173-186 Downloads
Kenneth Koford

Volume 6, issue 1, 1994

THE PARTISAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC CYCLES: MORE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES* pp. 1-23 Downloads
Douglas Hibbs
AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR THE MIDTERM GAP IN THE U.S. HOUSE* pp. 25-37 Downloads
Steven Levitt
A RETROSPECTIVE VOTING MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS POLITICIANS pp. 39-58 Downloads
W. Reed
INTEREST GROUPS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES* pp. 59-77 Downloads
Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li
WHY A FREE TRADE AREA? THE TARIFF ALSO RISES* pp. 79-96 Downloads
Martin Richardson

Volume 5, issue 3, 1993

EXIT, VOICE, AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE: AGENCY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP* pp. 205-218 Downloads
Louis Putterman
THE MARKET FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. SENATE 1980–1986* pp. 219-240 Downloads
James Snyder
BUREAUCRACY AND TIME CONSISTENCY* pp. 241-254 Downloads
Pertti Haaparanta and Mikko Puhakka
POLITICALLY REALISTIC IMPLEMENTATION WITH INSPECTION: THE EQUITY‐HONESTY‐WELFARE TRADE‐OFF pp. 255-270 Downloads
Ignacio Ortuño‐ortin and John Roemer
THE POLITICAL CHOICE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME* pp. 271-284 Downloads
L. J. Ruland and Jean-Marie Viaene
WHY SMALL GROUPS AND LOW INCOME SECTORS OBTAIN SUBSIDIES: THE “ALTRUISTIC” SIDE OF A “SELF‐INTERESTED” GOVERNMENT* pp. 285-293 Downloads
Johan Swinnen and Harry de Gorter

Volume 5, issue 2, 1993

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION: AN ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION pp. 85-104 Downloads
Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden
THE POLITICS OF MAASTRICHT pp. 105-123 Downloads
Geoffrey Garrett
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE EMU PROCESS pp. 125-144 Downloads
Lisa L. Martin
ON THE FEASIBILITY OF A ONE‐SPEED OR MULTISPEED EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION pp. 145-165 Downloads
Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli
THE TRANSITION TO EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE pp. 167-186 Downloads
Juergen von Hagen and Michele Fratianni
BEYOND EMU: THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINABILITY pp. 187-203 Downloads
Benjamin J. Cohen

Volume 5, issue 1, 1993

ANARCHY, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS pp. 1-14 Downloads
Karl Wärneryd
FORGETFULNESS AND THE POLITICAL CYCLE* pp. 15-25 Downloads
Ron Shachar
SOME INEFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF GENERATIONAL POLITICS AND EXCHANGE* pp. 27-42 Downloads
Laurence Kotlikoff and Robert Rosenthal
THE RIGHT VERSUS THE OBLIGATION TO VOTE: EFFECTS ON CROSS‐COUNTRY GOVERNMENT GROWTH* pp. 43-51 Downloads
W. Crain and Mary L. Leonard
REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION WITHOUT EXCESS BURDEN* pp. 53-60 Downloads
Dani Rodrik
MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION SPENDING: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION pp. 61-84 Downloads
Douglas Holtz‐eakin and Harvey S. Rosen

Volume 4, issue 3, 1992

PROBLEMS IN MODELING COMPLEX DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS: THE POLITICAL REALIGNMENT OF THE 1850s* pp. 215-254 Downloads
Robert Fogel
THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS* pp. 255-276 Downloads
Joseph E. Harrington
WHY DOES A TWO‐PARTY SYSTEM EXIST?: A NEW ECONOMIC EXPLANATION* pp. 277-288 Downloads
Shin-ichi Fukuda
TWO POLITICIANS, A PAC, AND HOW THEY INTERACT: TWO EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES* pp. 289-306 Downloads
Susan A. Edelman

Volume 4, issue 2, 1992

PROMISE KEEPING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: A MODEL OF CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING pp. 117-136 Downloads
B. KLElN Daniel
RENT‐SEEKING FIRMS AND CONSUMERS: AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS* pp. 137-149 Downloads
Torsten Schmidt
GATT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATION* pp. 151-170 Downloads
Dan Kovenock and Marie Thursby
PRUDENCE AND SUCCESS IN POLITICS pp. 171-189 Downloads
Olivier Cadot and Bernard Sinclair‐desgagné
VOTING ON GROWTH CONTROL MEASURES: PREFERENCES AND STRATEGIES* pp. 191-213 Downloads
Jeffrey A. Dubin, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Charles Noussair

Volume 4, issue 1, 1992

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES* pp. 1-30 Downloads
Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini
RENT SEEKING AND SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN TASTE CHANGE* pp. 31-42 Downloads
Joel M. Guttman, Shmuel Nitzan and Uriel Spiegel
QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND VERS: A NASH BARGAINING APPROACH* pp. 43-60 Downloads
Elias Dinopoulos
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROTECTION: LEGISLATED V. ADMINISTERED PROTECTION pp. 61-77 Downloads
H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson
ELECTIONS AND THE THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS* pp. 79-108 Downloads
Rebecca Morton and Charles Cameron
OF TIME AND POWER: LEADERSHIP DURATION IN THE MODERN WORLD pp. 109-115 Downloads
Brendan O'Flaherty

Volume 3, issue 3, 1991

THE PARADOX OF POWER* pp. 177-200 Downloads
Jack Hirshleifer
DANGO: JAPAN'S PRICE‐FIXING CONSPIRACIES pp. 201-218 Downloads
John McMillan
WAGES, PROFITS AND CAPITAL FLIGHT* pp. 219-237 Downloads
Andrés Velasco and Aarón Tornell
DEFAULT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT: IS IT JUSTIFIED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW? pp. 239-263 Downloads
George T. Kanaginis
ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN ECONOMICS pp. 265-277 Downloads
Pranab Bardhan
THE SPREAD OF KEYNESIANISM pp. 279-286 Downloads
Paul Streeten

Volume 3, issue 2, 1991

ON BUYING LEGISLATURES* pp. 93-109 Downloads
James Snyder
SPURIOUS INJURY AS INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: FREE TRADE UNDER THE PROSPECT OF PROTECTION* pp. 111-137 Downloads
Michael P. Leidy and Bernard Hoekman
SCREENING FOMC MEMBERS FOR THEIR BIASES AND DEPENDABILITY pp. 139-149 Downloads
Thomas Havrilesky and John Gildea
ORDERLY MARKETING ARRANGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GATT REGIME* pp. 151-162 Downloads
Yoshiyasu Ono
LOCAL BENEFIT‐SEEKING IN THE LEGISLATURE: AN INVESTIGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFFING DECISIONS* pp. 163-176 Downloads
Mark A. Zupan

Volume 3, issue 1, 1991

INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST‐FAVORED‐NATION CLAUSE* pp. 1-20 Downloads
Rodney Ludema
DISTRIBUTING THE GAINS FROM TRADE WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION* pp. 21-39 Downloads
Robert Feenstra and Tracy Lewis
VOTING AND THE INTERTEMPORAL SELECTION OF TAX RATES IN A MACRO‐ECONOMY* pp. 41-62 Downloads
Gregory Hess
EVALUATING RATIONAL PARTISAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY: A RESPONSE* pp. 63-71 Downloads
Alberto Alesina
RATIONAL CONSUMERS AND IRRATIONAL VOTERS: A REVIEW ESSAY ON BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY, BY STEPHEN MAGEE, WILLIAM BROCK AND LESLIE YOUNG, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1989 pp. 73-92 Downloads
David Austen‐Smith
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