Economics and Politics
1989 - 2022
Current editor(s): Peter Rosendorff From Wiley Blackwell Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery (). Access Statistics for this journal.
Track citations for all items by RSS feed
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.
Volume 6, issue 3, 1994
- SCHATTSCHNEIDER REVISITED: SENATE VOTING ON THE SMOOT‐HAWLEY TARIFF ACT OF 1930 pp. 187-199

- Richard T. Cupitt and Euel Elliott
- SAFE SEATS, MARGINAL SEATS, AND PARTY PLATFORMS: THE LOGIC OF PLATFORM DIFFERENTIATION* pp. 201-213

- James Snyder
- ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY: A TIME‐SERIES APPROACH* pp. 215-232

- Martin Rama
- WORDS AND DEEDS: SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE pp. 233-255

- Jim Granato and William West
- DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT, FINANCIAL ADAPTATION AND DELAYED STABILIZATIONS pp. 257-276

- Raúl Labán and Federico Sturzenegger
Volume 6, issue 2, 1994
- TRADE POLICY AND INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: A SYNTHESIS OF RECENT WORK† pp. 97-118

- Michael P. Leidy
- VOTING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WHEN LABOR SUPPLY IS ENDOGENOUS† pp. 119-130

- Friedrich Breyer
- RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* pp. 131-145

- Tyler Cowen, Amihai Glazer and Henry McMillan
- WINNER‐HELP‐LOSER GROUP FORMATION IN RENT‐SEEKING CONTESTS* pp. 147-162

- Kyung Baik
- DIMENSIONAL SIMPLIFICATION AND ECONOMIC THEORIES OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR pp. 163-172

- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal
- WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS FROM DIMENSIONAL STUDIES OF ROLL‐CALL VOTING? pp. 173-186

- Kenneth Koford
Volume 6, issue 1, 1994
- THE PARTISAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC CYCLES: MORE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES* pp. 1-23

- Douglas Hibbs
- AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR THE MIDTERM GAP IN THE U.S. HOUSE* pp. 25-37

- Steven Levitt
- A RETROSPECTIVE VOTING MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS POLITICIANS pp. 39-58

- W. Reed
- INTEREST GROUPS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES* pp. 59-77

- Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li
- WHY A FREE TRADE AREA? THE TARIFF ALSO RISES* pp. 79-96

- Martin Richardson
Volume 5, issue 3, 1993
- EXIT, VOICE, AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE: AGENCY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP* pp. 205-218

- Louis Putterman
- THE MARKET FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. SENATE 1980–1986* pp. 219-240

- James Snyder
- BUREAUCRACY AND TIME CONSISTENCY* pp. 241-254

- Pertti Haaparanta and Mikko Puhakka
- POLITICALLY REALISTIC IMPLEMENTATION WITH INSPECTION: THE EQUITY‐HONESTY‐WELFARE TRADE‐OFF pp. 255-270

- Ignacio Ortuño‐ortin and John Roemer
- THE POLITICAL CHOICE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME* pp. 271-284

- L. J. Ruland and Jean-Marie Viaene
- WHY SMALL GROUPS AND LOW INCOME SECTORS OBTAIN SUBSIDIES: THE “ALTRUISTIC” SIDE OF A “SELF‐INTERESTED” GOVERNMENT* pp. 285-293

- Johan Swinnen and Harry de Gorter
Volume 5, issue 2, 1993
- THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION: AN ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION pp. 85-104

- Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden
- THE POLITICS OF MAASTRICHT pp. 105-123

- Geoffrey Garrett
- INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE EMU PROCESS pp. 125-144

- Lisa L. Martin
- ON THE FEASIBILITY OF A ONE‐SPEED OR MULTISPEED EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION pp. 145-165

- Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli
- THE TRANSITION TO EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE pp. 167-186

- Juergen von Hagen and Michele Fratianni
- BEYOND EMU: THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINABILITY pp. 187-203

- Benjamin J. Cohen
Volume 5, issue 1, 1993
- ANARCHY, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS pp. 1-14

- Karl Wärneryd
- FORGETFULNESS AND THE POLITICAL CYCLE* pp. 15-25

- Ron Shachar
- SOME INEFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF GENERATIONAL POLITICS AND EXCHANGE* pp. 27-42

- Laurence Kotlikoff and Robert Rosenthal
- THE RIGHT VERSUS THE OBLIGATION TO VOTE: EFFECTS ON CROSS‐COUNTRY GOVERNMENT GROWTH* pp. 43-51

- W. Crain and Mary L. Leonard
- REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION WITHOUT EXCESS BURDEN* pp. 53-60

- Dani Rodrik
- MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION SPENDING: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION pp. 61-84

- Douglas Holtz‐eakin and Harvey S. Rosen
Volume 4, issue 3, 1992
- PROBLEMS IN MODELING COMPLEX DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS: THE POLITICAL REALIGNMENT OF THE 1850s* pp. 215-254

- Robert Fogel
- THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS* pp. 255-276

- Joseph E. Harrington
- WHY DOES A TWO‐PARTY SYSTEM EXIST?: A NEW ECONOMIC EXPLANATION* pp. 277-288

- Shin-ichi Fukuda
- TWO POLITICIANS, A PAC, AND HOW THEY INTERACT: TWO EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES* pp. 289-306

- Susan A. Edelman
Volume 4, issue 2, 1992
- PROMISE KEEPING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: A MODEL OF CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING pp. 117-136

- B. KLElN Daniel
- RENT‐SEEKING FIRMS AND CONSUMERS: AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS* pp. 137-149

- Torsten Schmidt
- GATT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATION* pp. 151-170

- Dan Kovenock and Marie Thursby
- PRUDENCE AND SUCCESS IN POLITICS pp. 171-189

- Olivier Cadot and Bernard Sinclair‐desgagné
- VOTING ON GROWTH CONTROL MEASURES: PREFERENCES AND STRATEGIES* pp. 191-213

- Jeffrey A. Dubin, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Charles Noussair
Volume 4, issue 1, 1992
- MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES* pp. 1-30

- Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini
- RENT SEEKING AND SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN TASTE CHANGE* pp. 31-42

- Joel M. Guttman, Shmuel Nitzan and Uriel Spiegel
- QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND VERS: A NASH BARGAINING APPROACH* pp. 43-60

- Elias Dinopoulos
- INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROTECTION: LEGISLATED V. ADMINISTERED PROTECTION pp. 61-77

- H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson
- ELECTIONS AND THE THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS* pp. 79-108

- Rebecca Morton and Charles Cameron
- OF TIME AND POWER: LEADERSHIP DURATION IN THE MODERN WORLD pp. 109-115

- Brendan O'Flaherty
Volume 3, issue 3, 1991
- THE PARADOX OF POWER* pp. 177-200

- Jack Hirshleifer
- DANGO: JAPAN'S PRICE‐FIXING CONSPIRACIES pp. 201-218

- John McMillan
- WAGES, PROFITS AND CAPITAL FLIGHT* pp. 219-237

- Andrés Velasco and Aarón Tornell
- DEFAULT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT: IS IT JUSTIFIED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW? pp. 239-263

- George T. Kanaginis
- ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN ECONOMICS pp. 265-277

- Pranab Bardhan
- THE SPREAD OF KEYNESIANISM pp. 279-286

- Paul Streeten
Volume 3, issue 2, 1991
- ON BUYING LEGISLATURES* pp. 93-109

- James Snyder
- SPURIOUS INJURY AS INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: FREE TRADE UNDER THE PROSPECT OF PROTECTION* pp. 111-137

- Michael P. Leidy and Bernard Hoekman
- SCREENING FOMC MEMBERS FOR THEIR BIASES AND DEPENDABILITY pp. 139-149

- Thomas Havrilesky and John Gildea
- ORDERLY MARKETING ARRANGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GATT REGIME* pp. 151-162

- Yoshiyasu Ono
- LOCAL BENEFIT‐SEEKING IN THE LEGISLATURE: AN INVESTIGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFFING DECISIONS* pp. 163-176

- Mark A. Zupan
Volume 3, issue 1, 1991
- INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST‐FAVORED‐NATION CLAUSE* pp. 1-20

- Rodney Ludema
- DISTRIBUTING THE GAINS FROM TRADE WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION* pp. 21-39

- Robert Feenstra and Tracy Lewis
- VOTING AND THE INTERTEMPORAL SELECTION OF TAX RATES IN A MACRO‐ECONOMY* pp. 41-62

- Gregory Hess
- EVALUATING RATIONAL PARTISAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY: A RESPONSE* pp. 63-71

- Alberto Alesina
- RATIONAL CONSUMERS AND IRRATIONAL VOTERS: A REVIEW ESSAY ON BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY, BY STEPHEN MAGEE, WILLIAM BROCK AND LESLIE YOUNG, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1989 pp. 73-92

- David Austen‐Smith
| |