Economics and Politics

1989 - 2022

Current editor(s): Peter Rosendorff

From Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Track citations for all items by RSS feed
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 6, issue 3, 1994

SCHATTSCHNEIDER REVISITED: SENATE VOTING ON THE SMOOT‐HAWLEY TARIFF ACT OF 1930 pp. 187-199

Richard T. Cupitt and Euel Elliott

SAFE SEATS, MARGINAL SEATS, AND PARTY PLATFORMS: THE LOGIC OF PLATFORM DIFFERENTIATION* pp. 201-213

James Snyder

ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY: A TIME‐SERIES APPROACH* pp. 215-232

Martin Rama

WORDS AND DEEDS: SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE pp. 233-255

Jim Granato and William West

DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT, FINANCIAL ADAPTATION AND DELAYED STABILIZATIONS pp. 257-276

Raúl Labán and Federico Sturzenegger

Volume 6, issue 2, 1994

TRADE POLICY AND INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: A SYNTHESIS OF RECENT WORK† pp. 97-118

Michael P. Leidy

VOTING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WHEN LABOR SUPPLY IS ENDOGENOUS† pp. 119-130

Friedrich Breyer

RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* pp. 131-145

Tyler Cowen, Amihai Glazer and Henry McMillan

WINNER‐HELP‐LOSER GROUP FORMATION IN RENT‐SEEKING CONTESTS* pp. 147-162

Kyung Baik

DIMENSIONAL SIMPLIFICATION AND ECONOMIC THEORIES OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR pp. 163-172

Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal

WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS FROM DIMENSIONAL STUDIES OF ROLL‐CALL VOTING? pp. 173-186

Kenneth Koford

Volume 6, issue 1, 1994

THE PARTISAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC CYCLES: MORE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES* pp. 1-23

Douglas Hibbs

AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR THE MIDTERM GAP IN THE U.S. HOUSE* pp. 25-37

Steven Levitt

A RETROSPECTIVE VOTING MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS POLITICIANS pp. 39-58

W. Reed

INTEREST GROUPS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES* pp. 59-77

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li

WHY A FREE TRADE AREA? THE TARIFF ALSO RISES* pp. 79-96

Martin Richardson

Volume 5, issue 3, 1993

EXIT, VOICE, AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE: AGENCY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP* pp. 205-218

Louis Putterman

THE MARKET FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. SENATE 1980–1986* pp. 219-240

James Snyder

BUREAUCRACY AND TIME CONSISTENCY* pp. 241-254

Pertti Haaparanta and Mikko Puhakka

POLITICALLY REALISTIC IMPLEMENTATION WITH INSPECTION: THE EQUITY‐HONESTY‐WELFARE TRADE‐OFF pp. 255-270

Ignacio Ortuño‐ortin and John Roemer

THE POLITICAL CHOICE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME* pp. 271-284

L. J. Ruland and Jean-Marie Viaene

WHY SMALL GROUPS AND LOW INCOME SECTORS OBTAIN SUBSIDIES: THE “ALTRUISTIC” SIDE OF A “SELF‐INTERESTED” GOVERNMENT* pp. 285-293

Johan Swinnen and Harry de Gorter

Volume 5, issue 2, 1993

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION: AN ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION pp. 85-104

Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden

THE POLITICS OF MAASTRICHT pp. 105-123

Geoffrey Garrett

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE EMU PROCESS pp. 125-144

Lisa L. Martin

ON THE FEASIBILITY OF A ONE‐SPEED OR MULTISPEED EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION pp. 145-165

Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli

THE TRANSITION TO EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE pp. 167-186

Juergen von Hagen and Michele Fratianni

BEYOND EMU: THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINABILITY pp. 187-203

Benjamin J. Cohen

Volume 5, issue 1, 1993

ANARCHY, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS pp. 1-14

Karl Wärneryd

FORGETFULNESS AND THE POLITICAL CYCLE* pp. 15-25

Ron Shachar

SOME INEFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF GENERATIONAL POLITICS AND EXCHANGE* pp. 27-42

Laurence Kotlikoff and Robert Rosenthal

THE RIGHT VERSUS THE OBLIGATION TO VOTE: EFFECTS ON CROSS‐COUNTRY GOVERNMENT GROWTH* pp. 43-51

W. Crain and Mary L. Leonard

REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION WITHOUT EXCESS BURDEN* pp. 53-60

Dani Rodrik

MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION SPENDING: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION pp. 61-84

Douglas Holtz‐eakin and Harvey S. Rosen

Volume 4, issue 3, 1992

PROBLEMS IN MODELING COMPLEX DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS: THE POLITICAL REALIGNMENT OF THE 1850s* pp. 215-254

Robert Fogel

THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS* pp. 255-276

Joseph E. Harrington

WHY DOES A TWO‐PARTY SYSTEM EXIST?: A NEW ECONOMIC EXPLANATION* pp. 277-288

Shin-ichi Fukuda

TWO POLITICIANS, A PAC, AND HOW THEY INTERACT: TWO EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES* pp. 289-306

Susan A. Edelman

Volume 4, issue 2, 1992

PROMISE KEEPING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: A MODEL OF CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING pp. 117-136

B. KLElN Daniel

RENT‐SEEKING FIRMS AND CONSUMERS: AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS* pp. 137-149

Torsten Schmidt

GATT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATION* pp. 151-170

Dan Kovenock and Marie Thursby

PRUDENCE AND SUCCESS IN POLITICS pp. 171-189

Olivier Cadot and Bernard Sinclair‐desgagné

VOTING ON GROWTH CONTROL MEASURES: PREFERENCES AND STRATEGIES* pp. 191-213

Jeffrey A. Dubin, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Charles Noussair

Volume 4, issue 1, 1992

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES* pp. 1-30

Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini

RENT SEEKING AND SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN TASTE CHANGE* pp. 31-42

Joel M. Guttman, Shmuel Nitzan and Uriel Spiegel

QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND VERS: A NASH BARGAINING APPROACH* pp. 43-60

Elias Dinopoulos

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROTECTION: LEGISLATED V. ADMINISTERED PROTECTION pp. 61-77

H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson

ELECTIONS AND THE THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS* pp. 79-108

Rebecca Morton and Charles Cameron

OF TIME AND POWER: LEADERSHIP DURATION IN THE MODERN WORLD pp. 109-115

Brendan O'Flaherty

Volume 3, issue 3, 1991

THE PARADOX OF POWER* pp. 177-200

Jack Hirshleifer

DANGO: JAPAN'S PRICE‐FIXING CONSPIRACIES pp. 201-218

John McMillan

WAGES, PROFITS AND CAPITAL FLIGHT* pp. 219-237

Andrés Velasco and Aarón Tornell

DEFAULT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT: IS IT JUSTIFIED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW? pp. 239-263

George T. Kanaginis

ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN ECONOMICS pp. 265-277

Pranab Bardhan

THE SPREAD OF KEYNESIANISM pp. 279-286

Paul Streeten

Volume 3, issue 2, 1991

ON BUYING LEGISLATURES* pp. 93-109

James Snyder

SPURIOUS INJURY AS INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: FREE TRADE UNDER THE PROSPECT OF PROTECTION* pp. 111-137

Michael P. Leidy and Bernard Hoekman

SCREENING FOMC MEMBERS FOR THEIR BIASES AND DEPENDABILITY pp. 139-149

Thomas Havrilesky and John Gildea

ORDERLY MARKETING ARRANGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GATT REGIME* pp. 151-162

Yoshiyasu Ono

LOCAL BENEFIT‐SEEKING IN THE LEGISLATURE: AN INVESTIGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFFING DECISIONS* pp. 163-176

Mark A. Zupan

Volume 3, issue 1, 1991

INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST‐FAVORED‐NATION CLAUSE* pp. 1-20

Rodney Ludema

DISTRIBUTING THE GAINS FROM TRADE WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION* pp. 21-39

Robert Feenstra and Tracy Lewis

VOTING AND THE INTERTEMPORAL SELECTION OF TAX RATES IN A MACRO‐ECONOMY* pp. 41-62

Gregory Hess

EVALUATING RATIONAL PARTISAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY: A RESPONSE* pp. 63-71

Alberto Alesina

RATIONAL CONSUMERS AND IRRATIONAL VOTERS: A REVIEW ESSAY ON BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY, BY STEPHEN MAGEE, WILLIAM BROCK AND LESLIE YOUNG, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1989 pp. 73-92

David Austen‐Smith