Economics and Politics

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): Peter Rosendorff

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Introduction pp. 205-205: T. Srinivasan
Will Free Trade with Political Science Put Normative Economists Out of Work? pp. 207-219: B. O'Flaherty and J. Bhagwati
Advising Rational Agents pp. 221-224: I. Levi
Economists as Advisers to Politicians and to Society pp. 225-230: Avinash Dixit
On Misunderstanding Government: an Analysis of the Art of Policy Advice pp. 231-250: Kaushik Basu
The Credibility of the PRC Commitment to a Market Economy in Hong Kong: Hypotheses and Evidence pp. 251-280: D. Newman and David Weimer

Democracies and Inefficiency pp. 99-114: S. A. Baba
Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints pp. 115-131: Cesar Martinelli and Mariano Tommasi
The Evolutionary Stability of Moral Objections to Free Riding pp. 133-149: Werner Güth and Shmuel Nitzan
Rationality in a Political‐Economic Environment pp. 151-172: R. Grafstein
Local Government Spending and At‐Large Versus District Representation; Do Wards Result in More “Pork”? pp. 173-203: L. Southwick, Jr

Presidential Reputation and the Veto pp. 1-26: Nolan M. McCarty
Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: Policy Issues in Closed and Open Economies pp. 27-54: Giancarlo Corsetti and Nouriel Roubini
An Empirical Analysis of the Political Economy of Tariffs pp. 55-70: Krishna Srinivasan
The Explanatory Power of Game Theory in International Politics: Syrian–Israeli Crisis Interactions, 1951–87 pp. 71-85: Joel M. Guttman
GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation: A Note pp. 87-93: Shannon Mitchell
GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation: A Reply pp. 95-98: Dan Kovenock and Marie Thursby

IS THERE A “CULTURE OF SPENDING” IN CONGRESS? pp. 191-211: Arsene Aka, W. Reed, D. Eric Schansberg and Zhen Zhu
A MODEL OF VOTER CHOICE IN A LIFE‐CYCLE SETTING pp. 213-229: Stephen Blomberg
EXPLORING POTENTIAL ARMS RACES pp. 231-240: Carlos Seiglie
URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: THE INTRODUCTION OF AN pp. 241-249: Shigemi Yabuuchi
POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY† pp. 251-265: Michelle Garfinkel and Amihai Glazer

ENDOGENOUS ELECTION TIMING IN MAJORITARIAN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS* pp. 85-110: Alastair Smith
ANTIDUMPING POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: POLITICAL DISCRETION OR TECHNICAL DETERMINATION pp. 111-131: Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht
PUBLIC GOODS, INDIVISIBLE GOODS, AND MARKET FAILURE pp. 133-143: Daniel Sutter
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, INFORMATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC GROUPS pp. 145-189: Helen V. Milner and B. Rosendorff

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LEGAL SEGREGATION: JIM CROW AND RACIAL EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS pp. 1-15: Gary M. Anderson and Dennis Halcoussis
FOMC VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL CYCLES: PARTISAN IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN LOYALTY pp. 17-32: Rob Roy McGregor
CAPITAL CONTROLS AND CONFLICT OF INTERESTS pp. 33-50: Daniele Checchi
THE RATIONALLY SHRINKING UNION pp. 51-59: Barry Nalebuff and Richard Sansing
THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN ENDOGENOUS PROTECTION AND DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT pp. 61-72: Laixun Zhao
THE POLITICS OF PRECOMMITMENT WITH ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY AND TRANSACTION COSTS pp. 73-84: Mark Gradstein

A SIGNALING MODEL OF COMPETITIVE POLITICAL PRESSURES pp. 181-206: Susanne Lohmann
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES pp. 207-227: Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer
THE PROFITABILITY OF COLONIAL INVESTMENT pp. 229-241: Herschel Grossman and Murat Iyigun
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF QUOTA RENTS IN A DYNAMIC INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL* pp. 243-261: Shannon Mitchell
DICTATORS, DEMOCRACIES, AND VOTERS: A COMMENT ON THE RIGHT VERSUS THE OBLIGATION TO VOTE pp. 263-270: Eliyahu Yeret
COMPULSORY VOTING AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING pp. 271-280: Francis O'Toole and Eric Strobl
THE RIGHT VERSUS THE OBLIGATION TO VOTE: REJOINDER TO YERET, AND O'TOOLE AND STROBL* pp. 281-287: W. Crain

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH ENDOGENOUS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION pp. 93-117: Alberto Ades
INTEREST GROUPS, INFLUENCE AND WELFARE pp. 119-146: Richard Ball
RENT DISSIPATION AND THE SOCIAL COST OF PRICE POLICY pp. 147-166: Jay Coggins
STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS* pp. 167-179: Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad

POLITICAL CYCLES pp. 1-20: John Roemer
SEARCH BEHAVIOR OF ASYMMETRICALLY INFORMED VOTERS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY* pp. 21-41: Sugato Dasgupta and Kenneth C. Williams
PREFERENCES FOR STATE TAX AND SPENDING POLICIES: EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY DATA ON THE ROLE OF INCOME pp. 43-58: Judy Temple and Susan Porter‐Hudak
DO GOOD OR DO WELL? PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT IN A TWO‐PARTY ECONOMY* pp. 59-78: Gian Maria Milesi‐Ferretti
INTENSITY OF COMPETITION, ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN RENT SEEKING CONTESTS pp. 79-91: Mark Gradstein

SCHATTSCHNEIDER REVISITED: SENATE VOTING ON THE SMOOT‐HAWLEY TARIFF ACT OF 1930 pp. 187-199: Richard T. Cupitt and Euel Elliott
SAFE SEATS, MARGINAL SEATS, AND PARTY PLATFORMS: THE LOGIC OF PLATFORM DIFFERENTIATION* pp. 201-213: James Snyder
ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY: A TIME‐SERIES APPROACH* pp. 215-232: Martin Rama
WORDS AND DEEDS: SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE pp. 233-255: Jim Granato and William West
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT, FINANCIAL ADAPTATION AND DELAYED STABILIZATIONS pp. 257-276: Raúl Labán and Federico Sturzenegger

TRADE POLICY AND INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: A SYNTHESIS OF RECENT WORK† pp. 97-118: Michael P. Leidy
VOTING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WHEN LABOR SUPPLY IS ENDOGENOUS† pp. 119-130: Friedrich Breyer
RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* pp. 131-145: Tyler Cowen, Amihai Glazer and Henry McMillan
WINNER‐HELP‐LOSER GROUP FORMATION IN RENT‐SEEKING CONTESTS* pp. 147-162: Kyung Baik
DIMENSIONAL SIMPLIFICATION AND ECONOMIC THEORIES OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR pp. 163-172: Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal
WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS FROM DIMENSIONAL STUDIES OF ROLL‐CALL VOTING? pp. 173-186: Kenneth Koford

THE PARTISAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC CYCLES: MORE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES* pp. 1-23: Douglas Hibbs
AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR THE MIDTERM GAP IN THE U.S. HOUSE* pp. 25-37: Steven Levitt
A RETROSPECTIVE VOTING MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS POLITICIANS pp. 39-58: W. Reed
INTEREST GROUPS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES* pp. 59-77: Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li
WHY A FREE TRADE AREA? THE TARIFF ALSO RISES* pp. 79-96: Martin Richardson