Economics and Politics
1989 - 2022
Current editor(s): Peter Rosendorff
From Wiley Blackwell
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Volume 2, issue 3, 1990
- DESIGNING POLICY TO OPEN TRADE* pp. 223-240

- Robert Feenstra, Tracy Lewis and John McMillan
- ARE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT TRANSFER POLICIES SELF‐DEFEATING IN POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM?* pp. 241-258

- John Wilson
- VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS* pp. 259-273

- Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman
- ALTRUISM, EGOISM, AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* pp. 275-290

- Bob Chirinko
- SELF‐INTEREST AND THE SENATE VOTE ON DIRECT ELECTIONS* pp. 291-302

- Lawrence Kenny and Mark Rush
Volume 2, issue 2, 1990
- PUBLIC GOODS, RENT DISSIPATION, AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION* pp. 115-132

- Heinrich Ursprung
- WHY ARE THERE DEMOCRACIES? A PRINCIPAL AGENT ANSWER* pp. 133-155

- Brendan O'Flaherty
- A THEORY OF KLEPTOCRACY WITH PROBABILISTIC SURVIVAL AND REPUTATION* pp. 157-171

- Herschel Grossman and Suk Jae Noh
- HOW LONG DO CONGRESSMEN STAY IN OFFICE?* pp. 173-191

- W. Reed and D. Eric Schansberg
- THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs* pp. 193-221

- Ronald Findlay
Volume 2, issue 1, 1990
- THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS pp. 1-23

- Paul Milgrom, Douglass North and Barry Weingast
- THE CARE AND HANDLING OF MONETARY AUTHORITIES* pp. 25-44

- Brendan O'Flaherty
- THE ECONOMICS OF SECTION 301: A GAME‐THEORETIC GUIDE* pp. 45-57

- John McMillan
- DIMENSIONS, TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND COALITIONS IN LEGISLATIVE VOTING* pp. 59-82

- Kenneth Koford
- UNIFORMITY VERSUS SELECTIVITY IN INDIRECT TAXATION* pp. 83-108

- Nicholas Stern
- PERESTROIKA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY pp. 109-114

- Robert Davies
Volume 1, issue 3, 1989
- TAX‐PRICE REFORM WITH DIRECTLY UNPRODUCTIVE PROFIT‐SEEKING (DUP) ACTIVITIES* pp. 207-224

- Pradeep K. Mitra
- THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT* pp. 225-237

- Amihai Glazer
- EVALUATING RATIONAL PARTISAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY* pp. 239-259

- Steven Sheffrin
- PERFORMANCE CONTINGENT PROTECTION* pp. 261-275

- William Kaempfer, Edward Tower and Thomas D. Willett
- OPTIMAL THREAT OF TRADE RESTRICTION AND QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT* pp. 277-300

- Kar‐yiu Wong
- THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY pp. 301-314

- Douglas Nelson
Volume 1, issue 2, 1989
- AN OPTIMAL TAX TREATMENT OF LEVIATHAN* pp. 97-117

- John Wilson
- PARALLEL AND OVERLAPPING GAMES: THEORY AND AN APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN GAS TRADE* pp. 119-144

- James E. Alt and Barry Eichengreen
- QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT* pp. 145-160

- Elias Dinopoulos
- THE PARALLEL MARKET IN CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES pp. 161-179

- Arvind Panagariya
- REVENUE SEEKING AND METZLER PARADOXES pp. 181-185

- Shigemi Yabuuchi
- ROEMER ON MARX ON EXPLOITATION pp. 187-199

- Duncan Foley
- LONG WAVES IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS pp. 201-206

- Charles P. Kindleberger
Volume 1, issue 1, 1989
- THE ECONOMICS OF ILLUSION* pp. 1-15

- George Akerlof
- POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS* pp. 17-39

- Arye Hillman and John G. Riley
- POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PEEL'S REPEAL OF THE CORN LAWS pp. 41-59

- Douglas Irwin
- TARIFF FORMATION IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL VOTING MODEL* pp. 61-79

- Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman
- MEASURING THE DEADWEIGHT COSTS OF DUP AND RENT SEEKING ACTIVITIES pp. 81-95

- Hal Varian