Economics and Politics

1989 - 2022

Current editor(s): Peter Rosendorff

From Wiley Blackwell
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Volume 2, issue 3, 1990

DESIGNING POLICY TO OPEN TRADE* pp. 223-240

Robert Feenstra, Tracy Lewis and John McMillan

ARE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT TRANSFER POLICIES SELF‐DEFEATING IN POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM?* pp. 241-258

John Wilson

VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS* pp. 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman

ALTRUISM, EGOISM, AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* pp. 275-290

Bob Chirinko

SELF‐INTEREST AND THE SENATE VOTE ON DIRECT ELECTIONS* pp. 291-302

Lawrence Kenny and Mark Rush

Volume 2, issue 2, 1990

PUBLIC GOODS, RENT DISSIPATION, AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION* pp. 115-132

Heinrich Ursprung

WHY ARE THERE DEMOCRACIES? A PRINCIPAL AGENT ANSWER* pp. 133-155

Brendan O'Flaherty

A THEORY OF KLEPTOCRACY WITH PROBABILISTIC SURVIVAL AND REPUTATION* pp. 157-171

Herschel Grossman and Suk Jae Noh

HOW LONG DO CONGRESSMEN STAY IN OFFICE?* pp. 173-191

W. Reed and D. Eric Schansberg

THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs* pp. 193-221

Ronald Findlay

Volume 2, issue 1, 1990

THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS pp. 1-23

Paul Milgrom, Douglass North and Barry Weingast

THE CARE AND HANDLING OF MONETARY AUTHORITIES* pp. 25-44

Brendan O'Flaherty

THE ECONOMICS OF SECTION 301: A GAME‐THEORETIC GUIDE* pp. 45-57

John McMillan

DIMENSIONS, TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND COALITIONS IN LEGISLATIVE VOTING* pp. 59-82

Kenneth Koford

UNIFORMITY VERSUS SELECTIVITY IN INDIRECT TAXATION* pp. 83-108

Nicholas Stern

PERESTROIKA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY pp. 109-114

Robert Davies

Volume 1, issue 3, 1989

TAX‐PRICE REFORM WITH DIRECTLY UNPRODUCTIVE PROFIT‐SEEKING (DUP) ACTIVITIES* pp. 207-224

Pradeep K. Mitra

THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT* pp. 225-237

Amihai Glazer

EVALUATING RATIONAL PARTISAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY* pp. 239-259

Steven Sheffrin

PERFORMANCE CONTINGENT PROTECTION* pp. 261-275

William Kaempfer, Edward Tower and Thomas D. Willett

OPTIMAL THREAT OF TRADE RESTRICTION AND QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT* pp. 277-300

Kar‐yiu Wong

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY pp. 301-314

Douglas Nelson

Volume 1, issue 2, 1989

AN OPTIMAL TAX TREATMENT OF LEVIATHAN* pp. 97-117

John Wilson

PARALLEL AND OVERLAPPING GAMES: THEORY AND AN APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN GAS TRADE* pp. 119-144

James E. Alt and Barry Eichengreen

QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT* pp. 145-160

Elias Dinopoulos

THE PARALLEL MARKET IN CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES pp. 161-179

Arvind Panagariya

REVENUE SEEKING AND METZLER PARADOXES pp. 181-185

Shigemi Yabuuchi

ROEMER ON MARX ON EXPLOITATION pp. 187-199

Duncan Foley

LONG WAVES IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS pp. 201-206

Charles P. Kindleberger

Volume 1, issue 1, 1989

THE ECONOMICS OF ILLUSION* pp. 1-15

George Akerlof

POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS* pp. 17-39

Arye Hillman and John G. Riley

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PEEL'S REPEAL OF THE CORN LAWS pp. 41-59

Douglas Irwin

TARIFF FORMATION IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL VOTING MODEL* pp. 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman

MEASURING THE DEADWEIGHT COSTS OF DUP AND RENT SEEKING ACTIVITIES pp. 81-95

Hal Varian