Economics and Politics

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): Peter Rosendorff

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DEMOCRACY AND GLOBALIZATION pp. 289-334: Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang
POLICY COMPROMISES: CORRUPTION AND REGULATION IN A DEMOCRACY pp. 335-360: Toke Aidt and Jayasri Dutta
THE NON‐TRADED SECTOR, LOBBYING, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE COMMON MARKET pp. 361-390: Cyrille Schwellnus
DOES COMPULSORY VOTING HELP EQUALIZE INCOMES? pp. 391-415: Alberto Chong and Mauricio Olivera
VOTING, LOBBYING, AND THE DECENTRALIZATION THEOREM pp. 416-431: Ben Lockwood

IS AN EXPORT SUBSIDY A ROBUST TRADE POLICY RECOMMENDATION TOWARD A UNIONIZED DUOPOLY? pp. 141-155: Jie Ma
CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS: A STRUCTURAL BREAKS APPROACH pp. 156-184: Anders Olofsgård and Zaki Zahran
SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHENING PATENT PROTECTION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY pp. 185-215: Angus Chu
THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT PARTISANSHIP: AND THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT pp. 216-254: Pablo M. Pinto and Santiago Pinto
THE WTO AND ANTIDUMPING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES pp. 255-288: Chad Bown

PUBLIC PROTECTION OR PRIVATE EXTORTION? pp. 1-32: Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Catherine Hafer
POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS pp. 33-61: James E. Alt and David Lassen
A THEORY OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR pp. 62-79: Yoshiaki Azuma and Herschel Grossman
WHEN TO RUN AND WHEN TO HIDE: ELECTORAL COORDINATION AND EXIT pp. 80-105: Indridi Indridason
CAN UNIONS HURT WORKERS? A POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY pp. 106-124: Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni
CONDITIONING AID ON SOCIAL EXPENDITURES pp. 125-140: William Jack

INFLUENCE, ELECTIONS, AND THE VALUE OF A VOTE IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES pp. 289-315: Christopher S. P. Magee
THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT pp. 317-344: Christian Daude and Ernesto Stein
THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF IN A CUSTOMS UNION: VOTING, LOGROLLING, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INTERESTS pp. 345-368: Samia Costa Tavares
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BUDGET DEFICITS pp. 369-420: Lori L. Leachman, Guillermo Rosas, Peter Lange and Alan Bester
THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN FIRMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES pp. 421-451: Rodolphe Desbordes and Julien Vauday
THE USEFULNESS OF IMPERFECT ELECTIONS: THE CASE OF VILLAGE ELECTIONS IN RURAL CHINA pp. 453-480: Loren Brandt and Matthew Turner

PARTISAN POLITICS, INTEREST RATES AND THE STOCK MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN AND BRITISH RETURNS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY pp. 135-167: Bumba Mukherjee and David Leblang
FREE TRADE AREAS AND RULES OF ORIGIN: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS pp. 169-190: Rupa Duttagupta and Arvind Panagariya
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE pp. 191-218: Priya Ranjan and Jae Young Lee
POLICY EVALUATION IN THE PRESENCE OF OUTSOURCING: GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS VERSUS POLITICAL FEASIBILITY pp. 219-234: Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Howard Wall
GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO U.S. MARKETS pp. 235-258: Daniel Lederman and Çaglar Özden
A RATIONAL CHOICE EXPLANATION FOR STALIN'S “GREAT TERROR” pp. 259-287: Vahe Lskavyan

PUBLIC FINANCE AND INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES OVER GLOBALIZATION STRATEGIES pp. 1-33: Gordon Hanson, Kenneth Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter
DO GOVERNMENTS SUPPRESS GROWTH? INSTITUTIONS, RENT‐SEEKING, AND INNOVATION BLOCKING IN A MODEL OF SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH pp. 35-52: Azam Chaudhry and Phillip Garner
IS INEQUALITY HARMFUL FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN A GROWING ECONOMY? pp. 53-71: Hubert Kempf and Stéphane Rossignol
REVENUE TRAPS pp. 73-96: Scott Gehlbach
THE SELECTION OF POLICIES FOR BALLOT INITIATIVES: WHAT VOTERS CAN LEARN FROM LEGISLATIVE INACTION pp. 97-121: Frederick J. Boehmke and John W. Patty
PARTIES, ELECTIONS AND STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY pp. 123-134: Fotios Siokis and Panayotis Kapopoulos

ON THE CONFLICT–POVERTY NEXUS pp. 237-267: Stephen Blomberg, Gregory Hess and Siddharth Thacker
STOP US BEFORE WE SPEND AGAIN: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING pp. 269-312: David M. Primo
SHOULD YOU ARM YOUR FUTURE VICTIMS? pp. 313-338: Jean-Paul Azam
PROMISES MADE, PROMISES BROKEN: A MODEL OF IMF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION pp. 339-365: Joseph Joyce
DISENTANGLING THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION ON VOTER TURNOUT: THE FLEMISH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS pp. 367-387: Benny Geys and Bruno Heyndels
LOBBYING CONTESTS WITH ENDOGENOUS POLICY PROPOSALS pp. 389-397: Johannes Münster

SOCIAL COHESION, INSTITUTIONS, AND GROWTH pp. 103-120: William Easterly, Jozef Ritzen and Michael Woolcock
DOES MORE TRANSPARENCY GO ALONG WITH BETTER GOVERNANCE? pp. 121-167: Roumeen Islam
ON THE ROLE OF THE PRIMARY SYSTEM IN CANDIDATE SELECTION pp. 169-190: Mandar Oak
SPECIAL INTERESTS AND THE GAINS FROM POLITICAL INTEGRATION pp. 191-218: Daniel Brou and Michele Ruta
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: A RECONSIDERATION pp. 219-235: Daniel Treisman

COOPERATION, COOPTATION, AND REBELLION UNDER DICTATORSHIPS pp. 1-26: Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski
HOW DID THE 2003 PRESCRIPTION DRUG RE‐IMPORTATION BILL PASS THE HOUSE? pp. 27-45: Omer Gokcekus, Mike Adams, Henry Grabowski and Edward Tower
A NEW THEORY OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS pp. 47-70: Soumaya M. Tohamy, Hashem Dezhbakhsh and Peter H. Aranson
ELIMINATING THE INFLATIONARY FINANCE TRAP IN A POLITICALLY UNSTABLE COUNTRY: DOMESTIC POLITICS VS. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE pp. 71-94: Frank Bohn
CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN A CITIZEN CANDIDATE MODEL pp. 95-102: Jon Eguia