Economics and Politics

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): Peter Rosendorff

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EXIT, VOICE, AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE: AGENCY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP* pp. 205-218: Louis Putterman
THE MARKET FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. SENATE 1980–1986* pp. 219-240: James Snyder
BUREAUCRACY AND TIME CONSISTENCY* pp. 241-254: Pertti Haaparanta and Mikko Puhakka
POLITICALLY REALISTIC IMPLEMENTATION WITH INSPECTION: THE EQUITY‐HONESTY‐WELFARE TRADE‐OFF pp. 255-270: Ignacio Ortuño‐ortin and John Roemer
THE POLITICAL CHOICE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME* pp. 271-284: L. J. Ruland and Jean-Marie Viaene
WHY SMALL GROUPS AND LOW INCOME SECTORS OBTAIN SUBSIDIES: THE “ALTRUISTIC” SIDE OF A “SELF‐INTERESTED” GOVERNMENT* pp. 285-293: Johan Swinnen and Harry de Gorter

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION: AN ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION pp. 85-104: Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden
THE POLITICS OF MAASTRICHT pp. 105-123: Geoffrey Garrett
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE EMU PROCESS pp. 125-144: Lisa L. Martin
ON THE FEASIBILITY OF A ONE‐SPEED OR MULTISPEED EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION pp. 145-165: Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli
THE TRANSITION TO EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE pp. 167-186: Juergen von Hagen and Michele Fratianni
BEYOND EMU: THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINABILITY pp. 187-203: Benjamin J. Cohen

ANARCHY, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS pp. 1-14: Karl Wärneryd
FORGETFULNESS AND THE POLITICAL CYCLE* pp. 15-25: Ron Shachar
SOME INEFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF GENERATIONAL POLITICS AND EXCHANGE* pp. 27-42: Laurence Kotlikoff and Robert Rosenthal
THE RIGHT VERSUS THE OBLIGATION TO VOTE: EFFECTS ON CROSS‐COUNTRY GOVERNMENT GROWTH* pp. 43-51: W. Crain and Mary L. Leonard
REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION WITHOUT EXCESS BURDEN* pp. 53-60: Dani Rodrik
MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION SPENDING: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION pp. 61-84: Douglas Holtz‐eakin and Harvey S. Rosen

PROBLEMS IN MODELING COMPLEX DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS: THE POLITICAL REALIGNMENT OF THE 1850s pp. 215-254: Robert Fogel
THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS pp. 255-276: Joseph E. Harrington
WHY DOES A TWO‐PARTY SYSTEM EXIST?: A NEW ECONOMIC EXPLANATION pp. 277-288: Shin-ichi Fukuda
TWO POLITICIANS, A PAC, AND HOW THEY INTERACT: TWO EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES pp. 289-306: Susan A. Edelman

PROMISE KEEPING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: A MODEL OF CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING pp. 117-136: B. KLElN Daniel
RENT‐SEEKING FIRMS AND CONSUMERS: AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS* pp. 137-149: Torsten Schmidt
GATT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATION* pp. 151-170: Dan Kovenock and Marie Thursby
PRUDENCE AND SUCCESS IN POLITICS pp. 171-189: Olivier Cadot and Bernard Sinclair‐desgagné
VOTING ON GROWTH CONTROL MEASURES: PREFERENCES AND STRATEGIES* pp. 191-213: Jeffrey A. Dubin, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Charles Noussair

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES* pp. 1-30: Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini
RENT SEEKING AND SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN TASTE CHANGE* pp. 31-42: Joel M. Guttman, Shmuel Nitzan and Uriel Spiegel
QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND VERS: A NASH BARGAINING APPROACH* pp. 43-60: Elias Dinopoulos
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROTECTION: LEGISLATED V. ADMINISTERED PROTECTION pp. 61-77: Homer Hall and Douglas Nelson
ELECTIONS AND THE THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS* pp. 79-108: Rebecca Morton and Charles Cameron
OF TIME AND POWER: LEADERSHIP DURATION IN THE MODERN WORLD pp. 109-115: Brendan O'Flaherty

THE PARADOX OF POWER* pp. 177-200: Jack Hirshleifer
DANGO: JAPAN'S PRICE‐FIXING CONSPIRACIES pp. 201-218: John McMillan
WAGES, PROFITS AND CAPITAL FLIGHT* pp. 219-237: Andrés Velasco and Aarón Tornell
DEFAULT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT: IS IT JUSTIFIED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW? pp. 239-263: George T. Kanaginis
ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN ECONOMICS pp. 265-277: Pranab Bardhan
THE SPREAD OF KEYNESIANISM pp. 279-286: Paul Streeten

ON BUYING LEGISLATURES* pp. 93-109: James Snyder
SPURIOUS INJURY AS INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: FREE TRADE UNDER THE PROSPECT OF PROTECTION* pp. 111-137: Michael P. Leidy and Bernard Hoekman
SCREENING FOMC MEMBERS FOR THEIR BIASES AND DEPENDABILITY pp. 139-149: Thomas Havrilesky and John Gildea
ORDERLY MARKETING ARRANGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GATT REGIME* pp. 151-162: Yoshiyasu Ono
LOCAL BENEFIT‐SEEKING IN THE LEGISLATURE: AN INVESTIGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFFING DECISIONS* pp. 163-176: Mark A. Zupan

INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST‐FAVORED‐NATION CLAUSE* pp. 1-20: Rodney Ludema
DISTRIBUTING THE GAINS FROM TRADE WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION* pp. 21-39: Robert Feenstra and Tracy Lewis
VOTING AND THE INTERTEMPORAL SELECTION OF TAX RATES IN A MACRO‐ECONOMY* pp. 41-62: Gregory Hess
EVALUATING RATIONAL PARTISAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY: A RESPONSE* pp. 63-71: Alberto Alesina
RATIONAL CONSUMERS AND IRRATIONAL VOTERS: A REVIEW ESSAY ON BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY, BY STEPHEN MAGEE, WILLIAM BROCK AND LESLIE YOUNG, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1989 pp. 73-92: David Austen‐Smith

DESIGNING POLICY TO OPEN TRADE* pp. 223-240: Robert Feenstra, Tracy Lewis and John McMillan
ARE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT TRANSFER POLICIES SELF‐DEFEATING IN POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM?* pp. 241-258: John Wilson
VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS* pp. 259-273: Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman
ALTRUISM, EGOISM, AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* pp. 275-290: Bob Chirinko
SELF‐INTEREST AND THE SENATE VOTE ON DIRECT ELECTIONS* pp. 291-302: Lawrence Kenny and Mark Rush

PUBLIC GOODS, RENT DISSIPATION, AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION* pp. 115-132: Heinrich Ursprung
WHY ARE THERE DEMOCRACIES? A PRINCIPAL AGENT ANSWER* pp. 133-155: Brendan O'Flaherty
A THEORY OF KLEPTOCRACY WITH PROBABILISTIC SURVIVAL AND REPUTATION* pp. 157-171: Herschel Grossman and Suk Jae Noh
HOW LONG DO CONGRESSMEN STAY IN OFFICE?* pp. 173-191: W. Reed and D. Eric Schansberg
THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs* pp. 193-221: Ronald Findlay

THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS pp. 1-23: Paul Milgrom, Douglass North and Barry Weingast
THE CARE AND HANDLING OF MONETARY AUTHORITIES* pp. 25-44: Brendan O'Flaherty
THE ECONOMICS OF SECTION 301: A GAME‐THEORETIC GUIDE* pp. 45-57: John McMillan
DIMENSIONS, TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND COALITIONS IN LEGISLATIVE VOTING* pp. 59-82: Kenneth Koford
UNIFORMITY VERSUS SELECTIVITY IN INDIRECT TAXATION* pp. 83-108: Nicholas Stern
PERESTROIKA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY pp. 109-114: Robert Davies