Review of Law & Economics

2005 - 2024

Current editor(s): Francesco Parisi

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Two Advantages of the Negligence Rule Over Strict Liability when the Parties are Risk Averse pp. 18: Lando Henrik
Is a ‘Bad Individual’ more Condemnable than Several ‘Bad Individuals’? Examining the Scope-severity Paradox pp. 18: Gilles Grolleau, Lisette Ibanez and Naoufel Mzoughi
Individual or Enterprise Liability? The Roles of Sanctions and Liability Under Contractible and Non-contractible Safety Efforts pp. 28: Grepperud Sverre
Fairness Vs. Economic Efficiency: Lessons from an Interdisciplinary Analysis of Talmudic Bankruptcy Law pp. 38: Lipschütz Itay and Schwarz Mordechai E.
Leniency Programs and Cartel Organization of Multiproduct Firms pp. 39: Dargaud Emilie and Armel Jacques
US State Tort Liability Reform and Entrepreneurship pp. 45: John Dove and Dove Laura R.

Free Speech in Public Employment: Has the Supreme Court Clarified Matters? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Lane v Franks pp. 24: Connolly John P. and Wasserman Lewis M.
Should Jurors Deliberate? pp. 27: Guha Brishti
Refounding Law and Economics: Behavioral Support for the Predictions of Standard Economic Analysis pp. 35: Zamir Eyal
On the Invention of Identity Politics: The Buraku Outcastes in Japan pp. 95: John Ramseyer

The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance pp. 7: Mungan Murat C.
The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance pp. 7: Mungan Murat C.
Laudatio: Francesco Parisi pp. 9: Schaefer Hans-Bernd
Laudatio: Francesco Parisi pp. 9: Schaefer Hans-Bernd
The Coase Theorem, the Nonempty Core, and the Legal Neutrality Principle pp. 16: Crettez Bertrand
The Coase Theorem, the Nonempty Core, and the Legal Neutrality Principle pp. 16: Crettez Bertrand
Law and Economics as We Grow Younger pp. 20: Parisi Francesco
Law and Economics as We Grow Younger pp. 20: Parisi Francesco
Political Insulation, Technical Expertise and the Technocrat’s Paradox pp. 21: Pardow Diego G.
Political Insulation, Technical Expertise and the Technocrat’s Paradox pp. 21: Pardow Diego G.
Thinking Like (Law-And-) Economists – Legal Rules, Economic Prescriptions and Public Perceptions of Fairness pp. 42: Chavanne David
Thinking Like (Law-And-) Economists – Legal Rules, Economic Prescriptions and Public Perceptions of Fairness pp. 42: Chavanne David

The Effects of Hate Groups on Hate Crimes pp. 14: Yahagi Ken
On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers pp. 20: Tim Friehe and Gabuthy Yannick
Reducing Ethical Misconduct of Attorneys with Mandatory Ethics Training: A Dynamic Panel Approach pp. 23: Fagan Frank
Rawls, Taxation and Calabresi & Melamed’s Rules pp. 26: Riza Limor
Product Market Competition’s Effect on Earnings Management When Audit Quality Is Endogenous: Theory and Evidence pp. 35: Samuel Andrew and Schwartz Jeremy
A Rule of Reason Approach for Passive Minority Interests within the European Union pp. 41: Zevgolis Nikolaos E. and Panagiotis Fotis

Sharing of Cost Related Information Can Increase Consumer Welfare Under Risk-aversion pp. 12: Mungan Murat C.
How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers? pp. 19: Sung-Hoon Park and Sanghack Lee
A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator pp. 20: Crettez Bertrand and Regis Deloche
Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach pp. 30: Joao Faria, Franklin Mixon, Upadhyaya Ashish and Kamal Upadhyaya
Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts pp. 32: Eve-Angeline Lambert and Yves Oytana
Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game pp. 32: Paul Pecorino and Mark Van Boening

Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control: The Case of Going Private pp. 17: Ofir Moran
Expanding Shareholders’ Power: An Analysis of Reform Proposals in Malaysia pp. 18: Rachagan Shanthy and Mohd Sulaiman Aiman Nariman
Litigation and the Product Rule: A Rent Seeking Approach pp. 19: Jef De Mot and Miceli Thomas J.
Punishment Severity and Crime: The Case of Arkansas pp. 23: Barati Mehdi
Rethinking Apology in Tort Litigation Deficiencies in Comprehensiveness Undermine Remedial Effectiveness pp. 27: Reinders Folmer Christopher P., Mascini Peter and Leunissen Joost M.
Emissions Trading Hybrids: The Case of the EU ETS pp. 32: Woerdman Edwin and Nentjes Andries
Law and Literature: Theory and Evidence on Empathy and Guile pp. 33: Chen Daniel L.
Takeover Protection and Firm Value pp. 46: Andres Christian, Jacob Martin and Lennart Ulrich

A Note on Licenses in the Presence of Corruption pp. 14: Farmer Amy, Fabio Mendez and Samuel Andrew
Enforcement and Deterrence in Merger Control: The Case of Merger Remedies pp. 22: Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Lars Sørgard
Distributive Justice, Public Policies and the Comparison of Legal Rules: Quantify the “Price of Equity” pp. 23: Fabbri Marco and Britto Diogo Gc
Using Eminent Domain for Economic Development: Does it Increase Private Sector Employment? pp. 24: Turnbull Geoffrey, Salvino Robert and Tasto Michael
The Foundations of Judicial Diffusion in China: Evidence from an Experiment pp. 27: Chen Benjamin Minhao and Li Zhiyu
Utility Misperception in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly pp. 43: Bienenstock Sophie

Mere Preparation pp. 15: Mungan Murat C.
Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors? pp. 18: Bertrand Chopard, Fain Edwige and Roussey Ludivine
How Status Seeking may Prevent Coasean Bargaining pp. 20: Gilles Grolleau, Alain Marciano and Naoufel Mzoughi
Choosing Whether to Comply with a General Duty or with a Specification Standard pp. 21: Calcott Paul
The Tragedy of the Uncommons pp. 22: Brown Matthew and Cardiff-Hicks Brianna
Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal pp. 27: D’Agostino Elena and Maurizio Lisciandra
Will Procurement Officials be Biased to Disregard Procurement Rules in Favor of a Low-priced, Albeit Defective, Bid? pp. 30: Dekel Omer and Dotan Yoav

Empirical Legal Studies: CELS and CELSE pp. 1: Engel Christoph
The More Med-Mals, the Shorter the Litigation: Evidence from Florida pp. 20: Yousefi Kowsar
Police Incentives, Policy Spillovers, and the Enforcement of Drug Crimes pp. 29: DeAngelo Gregory J., R. Gittings and Amanda Ross
Missing Rich Offenders: Traffic Accidents and the Impartiality of Justice pp. 29: Kurmangaliyeva Madina
Cartels as Defensive Devices: Evidence from Decisions of the European Commission 2001–2010 pp. 31: Herold Daniel and Johannes Paha
Determinants of Judicial Efficiency Change: Evidence from Brazil pp. 36: Fauvrelle Thiago A. and Aléssio Tony Almeida
Are Advocates General Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Voting Behavior of the Advocates General at the European Court of Justice pp. 43: Frankenreiter Jens