Games

2009 - 2025

Current editor(s): Ms. Susie Huang

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Volume 5, issue 4, 2014

Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games pp. 1-23

Edward Cartwright and Denise Lovett

Condorcet Completion Methods that Inhibit Manipulation through Exploiting Knowledge of Electorate Preferences pp. 1-30

Richard F. Potthoff

A Note on the Core of TU-cooperative Games with Multiple Membership Externalities pp. 1-13

Heinrich H. Nax

Volume 5, issue 3, 2014

An Agent-Based Model of Institutional Life-Cycles pp. 1-28

Manuel Wäckerle, Bernhard Rengs and Wolfgang Radax

Learning in Networks—An Experimental Study Using Stationary Concepts pp. 1-20

Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Thomas Neumann and Bodo Vogt

Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics pp. 1-3

Wolfram Elsner, Torsten Heinrich, Henning Schwardt and Claudius Gräbner-Radkowitsch

Volume 5, issue 2, 2014

The Seawall Bargaining Game pp. 1-13

Rémy Delille and Jean-Christophe Pereau

Two-Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony pp. 1-11

Joao Faria, Franklin Mixon, Steven B Caudill and Samantha J. Wineke

Sequential Rationality in Continuous No-Limit Poker pp. 1-5

Thomas Norman

Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities pp. 1-19

Anat Lerner and Rica Gonen

Volume 5, issue 1, 2014

Examining Monotonicity and Saliency Using Level- k Reasoning in a Voting Game pp. 1-27

Anna Bassi and Kenneth C. Williams

Acknowledgement to Reviewers of Games in 2013 pp. 1-2

Games Editorial Office

Introducing Disappointment Dynamics and Comparing Behaviors in Evolutionary Games: Some Simulation Results pp. 1-25

Tassos Patokos

Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur pp. 1-37

Alexander Field

Volume 4, issue 4, 2013

Bimodal Bidding in Experimental All-Pay Auctions pp. 1-16

Christiane Ernst and Christian Thöni

Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection pp. 1-16

Jason Shachat and J. Swarthout

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Baccara Chemin de Fer pp. 1-27

Stewart N. Ethier and Carlos Gámez

An Adaptive Learning Model in Coordination Games pp. 1-22

Naoki Funai

External Pressure on Alliances: What Does the Prisoners’ Dilemma Reveal? pp. 1-22

Jane M. Binner, Leslie R. Fletcher, Vassili Kolokoltsov and Francesco Ciardiello

Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment pp. 1-24

Jürgen Fleiß and Stefan Palan

Strategic Voting in Heterogeneous Electorates: An Experimental Study pp. 1-24

Marcelo Tyszler and Arthur Schram

Population Games, Stable Games, and Passivity pp. 1-23

Michael J. Fox and Jeff S. Shamma

The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings pp. 1-21

Rica Gonen and Anat Lerner

Feature-Based Choice and Similarity Perception in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study pp. 1-19

Sibilla Di Guida and Giovanna Devetag

The Optimality of Team Contracts pp. 1-20

Mehmet Barlo and Ayça Özdoğan

Volume 4, issue 3, 2013

Solution Concepts of Principal-Agent Models with Unawareness of Actions pp. 1-24

Ying-Ju Chen and Xiaojian Zhao

Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information pp. 1-10

Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

The Effects of Entry in Bilateral Oligopoly pp. 1-21

Alex Dickson

Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons pp. 1-40

Joel Watson

The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Adaptive Dynamics pp. 1-25

Åke Brännström, Jacob Johansson and Niels Von Festenberg

An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining pp. 1-23

Katri Sieberg, David Clark, Charles Holt, Timothy Nordstrom and William Reed

Institutional Inertia and Institutional Change in an Expanding Normal-Form Game pp. 1-28

Torsten Heinrich and Henning Schwardt

Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building pp. 1-29

Ana Borges, Didier Laussel and Joao Correia-da-Silva

The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation pp. 1-20

James R. Brennan and Joel Watson

Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points pp. 1-20

Oliver Hart

Repeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players pp. 1-8

Arina Nikandrova

Reciprocity Effects in the Trust Game pp. 1-8

Alexander Smith

An Evolutionary Theory of Suicide pp. 1-11

Balázs Szentes and Caroline Thomas

Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden pp. 1-11

Ola Andersson and Hakan Holm

Volume 4, issue 2, 2013

Reciprocity in Locating Contributions: Experiments on the Neighborhood Public Good Game pp. 1-19

Siegfried Berninghaus, Werner Güth and Stephan Schosser

The Dynamics of Costly Signaling pp. 1-19

Elliott O. Wagner

A Note on Cooperative Strategies in Gladiators’ Games pp. 1-8

Jerome Ballet, Damien Bazin and Radu Vranceanu

Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation pp. 1-40

Muriel Niederle, Alvin Roth and Utku Unver

Fairness in Risky Environments: Theory and Evidence pp. 1-35

Silvester Van Koten, Andreas Ortmann and Vitezslav Babicky

Dynamic Properties of Evolutionary Multi-player Games in Finite Populations pp. 1-18

Bin Wu, Arne Traulsen and Chaitanya S. Gokhale

Volume 4, issue 1, 2013

Divorce Costs and Marital Dissolution in a One-to-One Matching Framework With Nontransferable Utilities pp. 1-19

Ismail Saglam

Two Pricing Mechanisms in Sponsored Search Advertising pp. 1-19

Wei Yang, Youyi Feng and Baichun Xiao

Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play pp. 1-20

Kristian Lindgren and Vilhelm Verendel

Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis of Biased Beliefs and Distributional Other-Regarding Preferences pp. 1-23

Ozan Aksoy and Jeroen Weesie

Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences pp. 1-12

Ahmed Doghmi

An Equilibrium Analysis of Knaster’s Fair Division Procedure pp. 1-17

Matthew Van Essen

Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation pp. 1-17

Bin Xu, Charles Cadsby, Liang-cong Fan and Fei Song

Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity pp. 1-16

Doruk İriş and Luis Santos-Pinto