Games

2009 - 2025

Current editor(s): Ms. Susie Huang

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Volume 13, issue 6, 2022

A Note on Binary Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions pp. 1-19

Achille Basile, Anna De Simone and Ciro Tarantino

The Strategy Method Risks Conflating Confusion with a Social Preference for Conditional Cooperation in Public Goods Games pp. 1-10

Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew, Victoire D’Amico and Claire Guérin

Endogenous Game Choice and Giving Behavior in Distribution Games pp. 1-32

Emin Karagözoğlu and Elif Tosun

Egalitarian-Equivalence and Strategy-Proofness in the Object Allocation Problem with Non-Quasi-Linear Preferences pp. 1-24

Hiroki Shinozaki

A Complete Analysis on the Risk of Using Quantal Response: When Attacker Maliciously Changes Behavior under Uncertainty pp. 1-24

Thanh Hong Nguyen and Amulya Yadav

Rational Play in Extensive-Form Games pp. 1-20

Giacomo Bonanno

An Experimental Investigation of Trusting Behaviour pp. 1-11

Clelia Mazzoni and Patrizia Sbriglia

Rent Dissipation in Simple Tullock Contests pp. 1-11

Alex Dickson, Ian MacKenzie and Petros Sekeris

Misperception and Cognition in Markets pp. 1-15

Benjamin Young

The Black Box as a Control for Payoff-Based Learning in Economic Games pp. 1-15

Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew and Stuart A. West

Characterizing Agent Behavior in Revision Games with Uncertain Deadline pp. 1-13

Zhuohan Wang and Dong Hao

The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting pp. 1-8

Marina Bánnikova and José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez

Construction of Equilibria in Strategic Stackelberg Games in Multi-Period Supply Chain Contracts pp. 1-26

Reza Azad Gholami, Leif Sandal and Jan Ubøe

Games over Probability Distributions Revisited: New Equilibrium Models and Refinements pp. 1-26

Stefan Rass, Sandra König and Stefan Schauer

Cournot’s Oligopoly Equilibrium under Different Expectations and Differentiated Production pp. 1-17

Nora Grisáková and Peter Štetka

Volume 13, issue 5, 2022

The Influence of Trial-By-Trial Feedback on Trust in Health, First-Episode and Chronic Psychosis pp. 1-14

Imke L. J. Lemmers-Jansen, Rune J. Wichmann, Sophie Perizonius and Sukhi S. Shergill

Social Learning between Groups: Imitation and the Role of Experience pp. 1-14

Karl Schlag

Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs pp. 1-14

Todd Kaplan and Aner Sela

Informational Hold Up and Intermediaries pp. 1-14

Naomi Utgoff

A Qualitative Game of Interest Rate Adjustments with a Nuisance Agent pp. 1-24

Jacek Krawczyk and Vladimir P. Petkov

Equilibrium Seeking and Optimal Selection Algorithms in Peer-to-Peer Energy Markets pp. 1-13

Wicak Ananduta and Sergio Grammatico

Call Auctions with Contingent Orders pp. 1-8

Isa Hafalir and Serkan Imisiker

Copyright Enforcement in Content-Sharing Platforms pp. 1-25

Kameshwari Shankar

Groundwater Usage and Strategic Complements: Part I (Instrumental Variables) pp. 1-19

Caleb M. Koch and Heinrich H. Nax

Groundwater Usage and Strategic Complements: Part II (Revealed Preferences) pp. 1-19

Caleb M. Koch and Heinrich H. Nax

Assortative Matching by Lottery Contests pp. 1-20

Chen Cohen, Ishay Rabi and Aner Sela

Do Output-Dependent Prizes Alleviate the Sabotage Problem in Tournaments? pp. 1-20

Thomas Glökler, Kerstin Pull and Manfred Stadler

Volume 13, issue 4, 2022

Media Trust: Official versus Commercial Outlets pp. 1-13

Xiaoli Guo

RewardRating: A Mechanism Design Approach to Improve Rating Systems pp. 1-11

Iman Vakilinia, Peyman Faizian and Mohammad Mahdi Khalili

Measuring Price Risk Aversion through Indirect Utility Functions: A Laboratory Experiment pp. 1-43

Ali Zeytoon-Nejad

Does Party Polarization Affect the Electoral Prospects of a New Centrist Candidate? pp. 1-20

Arnaud Dellis

Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation pp. 1-17

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay and Mandar Oak

Communication-Enhancing Vagueness pp. 1-27

Daniel H. Wood

The Intermediate Value Theorem and Decision-Making in Psychology and Economics: An Expositional Consolidation pp. 1-24

Aniruddha Ghosh, M. Khan and Metin Uyanık

Promoting Entry and Efficiency via Reserve Prices pp. 1-7

Fabio Michelucci

A Game-Theoretic Model of Voluntary Yellow Fever Vaccination to Prevent Urban Outbreaks pp. 1-14

Jovic Aaron S. Caasi, Brian M. Joseph, Heera J. Kodiyamplakkal, Jaelene Renae U. Manibusan, Leslie J. Camacho Aquino, Hyunju Oh, Jan Rychtář and Dewey Taylor

Volume 13, issue 3, 2022

Optimal Policymaking under Yardstick Vote: An Experimental Study pp. 1-24

Albert Argilaga and Jijian Fan

Asymmetric Horizontal Differentiation under Advertising in a Cournot Duopoly pp. 1-14

Malcolm Brady

Monte Carlo Methods for the Shapley–Shubik Power Index pp. 1-14

Yuto Ushioda, Masato Tanaka and Tomomi Matsui

Level- k Models and Overspending in Contests pp. 1-12

Malin Arve and Marco Serena

Backup Agreement as a Coordination Mechanism in a Decentralized Fruit Chain in a Developing Country pp. 1-18

Margy Nathalia Rojas Palacios, Diego León Peña Orozco and Jesús Gonzalez-Feliu

A Model of Trust pp. 1-27

Gabriele Bellucci

The Evolution of Cooperation in Two-Dimensional Mobile Populations with Random and Strategic Dispersal pp. 1-16

Kyle Weishaar and Igor V. Erovenko

On the Impact of an Intermediary Agent in the Ultimatum Game pp. 1-16

Ernan Haruvy and Yefim Roth

Overcoming Choice Inertia through Social Interaction—An Agent-Based Study of Mobile Subscription Decision pp. 1-16

Barsha Saha, Miguel Martínez-García, Sharad Bhattacharya and Rohit Joshi

The Distributed Kolkata Paise Restaurant Game pp. 1-21

Kalliopi Kastampolidou, Christos Papalitsas and Theodore Andronikos

Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions pp. 1-21

Ramzi Suleiman

Sustainability of Intertwined Supply Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach pp. 1-21

Olga Gorbaneva and Guennady Ougolnitsky

Memory Recall Bias of Overconfident and Underconfident Individuals after Feedback pp. 1-15

King-King Li

Quid Pro Quo CSR and Trade Liberalization in a Bilateral Monopoly pp. 1-11

Shih-Shen Chen, Chien-Shu Tsai and Chen Chen

What Can Game Theory Tell Us about an AI ‘Theory of Mind’? pp. 1-11

Michael S. Harré

Volume 13, issue 2, 2022

Risk Aversion, Managerial Reputation, and Debt–Equity Conflict pp. 1-10

Anna Dodonova

The Evolution of Ambiguity in Sender—Receiver Signaling Games pp. 1-19

Roland Mühlenbernd, Sławomir Wacewicz and Przemysław Żywiczyński

A Preface for the Special Issue “Economics of Conflict and Terrorism” pp. 1-2

João Ricardo Faria and Daniel Arce

CEO Bias and Product Substitutability in Oligopoly Games pp. 1-23

Elizabeth Schroeder, Carol Horton Tremblay and Victor J. Tremblay

What Economists Can Learn from “The Power of Us: Harnessing Our Shared Identities for Personal and Collective Success” by Jay J. Van Bavel and Dominick J. Packer pp. 1-3

Daniela Grieco

How Strong Are Soccer Teams? The “Host Paradox” and Other Counterintuitive Properties of FIFA’s Former Ranking System pp. 1-22

Marek M. Kaminski

Egalitarian Allocations and Convexity pp. 1-4

Irinel C. Dragan

A Note on Time Inconsistency and Endogenous Exits from a Currency Union pp. 1-8

Yuta Saito

Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players pp. 1-6

Marco Sahm

Correcting for Random Budgets in Revealed Preference Experiments pp. 1-14

Mir Adnan Mahmood and John Rehbeck

Should I Play or Should I Go? Individuals’ Characteristics and Preference for Uncertainty pp. 1-14

Tânia Saraiva and Tiago Gonçalves

Endogenous Abatement Technology Agreements under Environmental Regulation pp. 1-30

Naoto Aoyama and Emilson Silva

An Experimental Study of Strategic Voting and Accuracy of Verdicts with Sequential and Simultaneous Voting pp. 1-28

Lisa R. Anderson, Charles Holt, Katri K. Sieberg and Beth A. Freeborn

Volume 13, issue 1, 2022

An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games pp. 1-17

Maria Montero and Alex Possajennikov

Dynamic Programming for Computing Power Indices for Weighted Voting Games with Precoalitions pp. 1-17

Jochen Staudacher, Felix Wagner and Jan Filipp

Conflicts with Momentum pp. 1-12

James W. Boudreau, Timothy Mathews, Shane D. Sanders and Aniruddha Bagchi

Structural Stability of Coalitions: A Formal Model Highlighting the Role of Participants Positioned between Members and Neutral Actors pp. 1-12

Herman Monsuur and René H. P. Janssen

The Impact of Discretionary Measurement Criteria on Investors’ Judgement and Decisions pp. 1-14

Tiago Gonçalves

Evolution of Social Learning with Payoff and Content Bias pp. 1-15

Charles Perreault and Robert Boyd

Competition and Innovation in Markets with Technology Leaders pp. 1-20

Ku-Chu Tsao, Arijit Mukherjee and Achintya Ray

Identification and Control of Game-Based Epidemic Models pp. 1-20

Dario Madeo and Chiara Mocenni

Consciously Uncertain: A Bayesian Analysis of Preferences Formation pp. 1-20

Marco Stimolo, Sergio Beraldo, Salvatore Capasso and Valerio Filoso

Self-Enforcing Collective Counterterror Retaliation pp. 1-16

Andre Oliveira and Emilson Silva

White List: An Administrative Tool to Contrast Crime pp. 1-16

Amelia Barletta, Carlo Capuano and Alessandro De Iudicibus

Salience Bias and Overwork pp. 1-22

Fabio Römeis, Fabian Herweg and Daniel Müller

Overlapping Climate Clubs: Self-Enforcing R&D Networks to Mitigate Global Warming pp. 1-24

Emilson Silva and Chikara Yamaguchi

Partial Order Games pp. 1-49

Valeria Zahoransky, Julian Gutierrez, Paul Harrenstein and Michael Wooldridge

Acknowledgment to Reviewers of Games in 2021 pp. 1-2

Games Editorial Office

Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining pp. 1-25

Nicola Maaser, Fabian Paetzel and Stefan Traub

Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council pp. 1-25

Dóra Petróczy, Mark Francis Rogers and László Kóczy

Mean-Payoff Games with ω -Regular Specifications pp. 1-37

Julian Gutierrez, Thomas Steeples and Michael Wooldridge

Random Rank-Dependent Expected Utility pp. 1-10

Nail Kashaev and Victor Aguiar