Games
2009 - 2026
Current editor(s): Ms. Susie Huang From MDPI Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 17, issue 5, 2026
- The Last Costly Signal: How Generative AI Collapses Competence Signaling and Why Liability Sustains Markets for Expert Services pp. 1-39

- Andreas Bauer
- The Trap of Incomplete Information Games in the Attention Economy: A Simulation Study of Network Collapse and Restoration Strategies for Informational Hygiene pp. 1-16

- Yasuko Kawahata and Shunsuke Hatadani
- Cooperation During the Gezi Park Protests pp. 1-28

- Benjamin Beranek
- Patient-Level Costing, Strategic Reimbursement, and Budget-Constrained Coverage in Rare Diseases: A TDABC-Based Analysis of Severe Haemophilia A pp. 1-31

- Tânia Saraiva and Tiago José Leite Cardoso
- Nonlinear Dynamics of Social Exclusion via a Dynamic Extension of the Classical “Market for Lemons” Theory: Scapegoating as a Critical Phenomenon and Optimal Intervention Strategies pp. 1-19

- Yasuko Kawahata
- When Can the Weaker Player Win? A Game-Theoretic Model of Humans Against a More Powerful AI pp. 1-19

- Iman Vakilinia
- Carbon Border Adjustment and Strategic Environmental Quality: Quality Backfire and Market Contraction pp. 1-33

- Subhadip Ghosh, Anindita Sen and Arka Mukherjee
- Research on the Game Dynamics of Optional Public Goods pp. 1-14

- Haocheng Wu, Mengcheng Sun, Luhe Yang, Yunhua Xue and Lianzhong Zhang
- Bride Price, Circumstance-Contingent Repayment, and Marital Investment in China: A Two-Stage Investment and Nash Bargaining Model pp. 1-25

- Wenjun Fan and Yong Yoon
Volume 17, issue 4, 2026
- Endogenous Agreement Geometry in Nash Bargaining over a Continuum of Issues pp. 1-27

- Alessio Staffini
- Credence Goods in Markets with Collective Reputation: Nature of Equilibria and the Value of Certification pp. 1-21

- Erin Krupka, Thomas P. Lyon and Arnab Mitra
- An Extreme Learning Machine-Based Method for Solving Linear–Quadratic Nonzero-Sum Differential Games pp. 1-21

- Changdong Duan and Yuefei Yuan
- Inefficient Learning Leads to Efficient Coordination: A Repeated Stag-Hunt Game with Learning Agents pp. 1-18

- Ren Manfredi, Daniele Vilone, Tijan J. Cvetkovic, Franco Bagnoli and Andrea Guazzini
- Efficient Favouritism with Status Incentives: A Moral-Hazard Game of Delegation and Recognition pp. 1-25

- Swapnendu Banerjee, Oindrila Dey and Subhadip Ghosh
- Promotion Thresholds, Revenue Sharing, and Delivery Risk in Reward-Based Crowdfunding pp. 1-43

- Joyaditya Laik, Esther Gal-Or and Prakash Mirchandani
- Engineered Misunderstanding Under Psychological Warfare: A Bayesian Signaling Game of Felt-Understanding Collapse in the German Atomausstieg pp. 1-34

- Ryanne R. L. Fairchild
- Markovian Analysis of a Small Population Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game pp. 1-22

- Athanasios Kehagias
- Decentralized, Efficient, and Fair: Mean-Field Predictive Control for Bidirectional EV Coordination Under Uncertainty pp. 1-39

- Samuel M. Muhindo
- Fixed-Time Pursuit–Evasion Differential Game with Grönwall Constraints in Hilbert Space l 2 pp. 1-15

- Gafurjan Ibragimov, Saidakbar Gulomov and Bruno Antonio Pansera
Volume 17, issue 3, 2026
- Do Downstream Firms Strategically Accept Upstream Equity Participation? pp. 1-14

- Chiu-Hui Li and Jen-Yao Lee
- Nonlinear Dynamics of Evolutionary Public Goods Games with Consistent- and Inconsistent-Moral-Standard Exclusive Sanctions pp. 1-14

- Yang Chen and Xiaofeng Wang
- A Provable Semi-Infinite Programming Approach for Solving Constrained Dynamic Games pp. 1-20

- Tyler C. Gardner, Matthew W. Harris and Logan Lancaster
- When Context Shapes Preferences: Norm Erosion and Context-Dependent Fairness Concerns in Public Goods Games pp. 1-24

- Chanalak Chaisrilak and Thanee Chaiwat
- A Dynamic Game Model to Estimate Market Competitiveness: An Application to the Chinese Retail Oil Market pp. 1-18

- Ying Zheng, Jiayi Xu and Xiao-Bing Zhang
- Politically Dangerous Minds: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Vygotsky, Luria, and the Socially Mediated Survival of Knowledge pp. 1-18

- Ryanne R. L. Fairchild
- The Relationships Between Oil, Critical Minerals, and Military Expenditure: Evidence from the U.S. and China pp. 1-21

- Luccas Attílio, Joao Faria, Mauro Rodrigues and Emilson Silva
- Relative Consumption as Fitness: A Replicator–Mutator Model of Reference-Dependent Demand and Status Competition pp. 1-12

- Aras Yolusever
- Diffusion Mechanism of Regional Collaborative Strategy in Public Health Emergencies Considering Vertical Intervention pp. 1-25

- Xiaoli Li and Luo Wu
- The Effect of Competition on Dishonesty, Trade, and Consumer Trust pp. 1-34

- Silvia Martinez-Gorricho
- Game Theory Narratives of the Three-Body Trilogy pp. 1-13

- Noemí Navarro and Jean-Christophe Pereau
- Search Costs, Hassle Costs, and Drip Pricing: Equilibria with Rational Consumers and Firms pp. 1-17

- Michael Baye and John Morgan
- A Cooperative Pollution Control Differential Game with Randomly Switching Payoffs pp. 1-17

- Feiran Xu and Anna Tur
Volume 17, issue 2, 2026
- Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality pp. 1-17

- Amit Gayer
- Platform Empowerment and Digital Inclusion in Industrial Clusters: A Complex Network Game Analysis with Performance Feedback pp. 1-28

- Dingteng Wang, Chengwei Liu and Shuping Wang
- The Correlated Response Technique: Estimation, Incentives, and Comparison with Randomized Response at Equal Statistical Precision pp. 1-22

- Timothy Flannery
- Cooperation or Confrontation? An Evolutionary Game Study on Content Clipping Authorization in Live Streaming E-Commerce Under Platform Regulation pp. 1-36

- Feng Luo, Xinmiao Zhao and Tiantong Xu
- A Generalized Nash Equilibrium Approach to the Inverse Eigenvector Centrality Problem pp. 1-19

- Mauro Passacantando and Fabio Raciti
- Measuring Pitcher Production Fairly in Baseball Using the Shapley Value pp. 1-23

- Michael McBride
- Cooperation Collapse in the Harmony Game: Revisiting Scodel and Minas Through Evolutionary Game Theory pp. 1-12

- Shade T. Shutters
- How to Sell Debt (But Not Money) pp. 1-20

- Arup Daripa
Volume 17, issue 1, 2026
- Quadratic Programming Approach for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games pp. 1-12

- Sam Ganzfried
- On Collusion Sustainability and the Elasticity of Substitution pp. 1-9

- Marc Escrihuela-Villar
- Randomized Algorithms and Neural Networks for Communication-Free Multiagent Singleton Set Cover pp. 1-23

- Guanchu He, Colton Hill, Joshua H. Seaton and Philip N. Brown
- Monetary Policy Committees, Independence, and Influence pp. 1-23

- Esteban Colla-De-Robertis
- Equal Chances or Fewer Victims? Moral Judgments in Autonomous Vehicle Dilemmas pp. 1-14

- Alexander Matros, Eren Bilen and Leonid Matros
- All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits pp. 1-14

- Benjamin Kang and James Unwin
- Endowment Inequality in Common Pool Resource Games: An Experimental Analysis pp. 1-21

- Garrett Milam and Andrew Monaco
- Communication and Standoff pp. 1-17

- Catherine Hafer
- A Structural Measure of Bargaining Fragility in Multi-Domain Agreements pp. 1-16

- Robert Castro
- Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Boundedly Rational Agents: Theory and Experiment pp. 1-35

- Katsuhiko Nishizaki
- Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Envy-Freeness vs. Efficiency Revisited pp. 1-10

- Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour and Christian Klamler
- Exclusionary Contracts and Incentives to Innovate pp. 1-19

- Simen Ulsaker
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