Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)

1997 - 2024

Current editor(s): Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

From Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().

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Volume 169, issue 4, 2013

Damages Regimes, Precaution Incentives, and the Intensity Principle pp. 567-586

Urs Schweizer

Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders: Why are they So Hard to Explain? pp. 587-604

Thomas J. Miceli

Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians pp. 605-620

Winand Emons

Yes Men in Tournaments pp. 621-659

Jason G. Cummins and Ingmar Nyman

Dynamic Games of R&D Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly pp. 660-679

Changying Li and Jianhu Zhang

Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Starts, and Judicial Practice pp. 680-702

Régis Blazy, Bertrand Chopard, Eric Langlais and Ydriss Ziane

Innovation, Tort Law, and Competition pp. 703-719

Florian Baumann and Klaus Heine

The Influence of Lawyers and Fee Arrangements on Arbitration pp. 720-738

Nathalie Chappe and Yannick Gabuthy

Volume 169, issue 3, 2013

Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information pp. 383-406

Carsten Helm and Michael Neugart

Revisiting the Learned Hand Formula and Economic Analysis of Negligence pp. 407-432

Jeonghyun Kim

Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment pp. 433-450

Werner Güth, Maria Levati and Matteo Ploner

Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate? pp. 451-467

Frédéric Loss, Estelle Malavolti and Thibaud Vergé

Default Options and Social Welfare: Opt In versus Opt Out pp. 468-489

Jan Bouckaert and Hans Degryse

Not-for-Profit Hospitals and the Quality of Medical Care pp. 490-505

Kazuhiko Mikami

Spillover Effects of Minimum Wagesunder Union Wage Bargaining pp. 506-518

Marcus Dittrich and Andreas Knabe

Rational Signals of Weakness in a Market Entry Game pp. 519-530

Jurjen Kamphorst, Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst and Bastian Westbrock

Competition and Endogenous Impatience in Credence-Good Markets pp. 531-565

Jeremy Sandford

Volume 169, issue 2, 2013

Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence pp. 199-228

Miguel Fonseca and Hans-Theo Normann

Delegation and Consultation with Contingent Information pp. 229-252

Andrew McGee

The Division of Labour under Uncertainty pp. 253-274

Nigel Wadeson

Determinants of Ultimate Control of Large Firms in Transition Countries: Empirical Evidence pp. 275-303

Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller and Evgeni Peev

Entry Bias and Product Substitutability pp. 304-319

Lin Liu and X. Wang

Stakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulations pp. 320-338

Margrethe Aanesen and Claire Armstrong

Patience Cycles pp. 339-354

Richard Barnett, Joydeep Bhattacharya and Mikko Puhakka

Shareholder Protection and Outside Blockholders: Substitutes or Complements? pp. 355-381

Sergey Stepanov

Volume 169, issue 1, 2013

Behavioral Theory of Institutions 30th International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics June 6-9, 2012, Bruges, Belgium pp. 1-3

Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction pp. 4-22

Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt

Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction pp. 23-25

Michael Kurschilgen

An Old Measure of Decision-Making Quality Sheds New Light on Paternalism pp. 29-44

Shachar Kariv and Dan Silverman

Nudged to Be Consistent pp. 45-48

Christoph Engel

An Old Measure of Decision-Making Quality Sheds New Light on Paternalism pp. 49-52

Ansgar Wohlschlegel

Product Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco Regulation pp. 53-78

Christine Jolls

Information, Ideology, and Behavioral Public Policy pp. 79-85

Stefan Bechtold

Product Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco Regulation pp. 86-89

Urs Schweizer

Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy pp. 90-106

Sophie Bade

Ambiguity Aversion in Political Economy: On the State of the Art pp. 107-111

Catherine Hafer

Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy pp. 112-115

Paul Heidhues

Status Quo Deference and Policy Choice under Ambiguity pp. 116-128

Charles Manski

Status Quo Deference and Policy Choice under Ambiguity pp. 129-133

Daniel Göller

Thoughts on Policy Choice under Ambiguity pp. 134-138

Peter Klibanoff

Issue Advocacy and Mass Political Sophistication pp. 139-152

Catherine Hafer and Dimitri Landa

Issue Advocacy and Mass Political Sophistication pp. 153-156

Fabian Herweg

Issue Advocacy and Mass Political Sophistication pp. 157-159

Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms versus Ex Post Transaction Review pp. 160-183

Ronald J. Gilson and Alan Schwartz

Contracting over Private Benefits of Control pp. 184-189

Andreas Engert

Preventing Abuse by Controlling Shareholders pp. 190-196

Eric van Damme

30th International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics Behavioral Theory of Institutions June 6-9, 2012, Bruges, Belgium pp. 197-197

Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

Volume 168, issue 4, 2012

Dismissal Tournaments pp. 547-562

Oliver Gürtler and Matthias Kräkel

Factors Determining the Duration of Legal Disputes: An Empirical Analysis with Micro Data pp. 563-587

Giuseppe Di Vita

Due Diligence, Research Joint Ventures, and Incentives to Innovate pp. 588-611

Simona Fabrizi and Steffen Lippert

The Value of the Liability Insurance for Credit Suisse and UBS pp. 612-635

Mario Häfeli and Matthias P. Jüttner

Has Assistance from USAID been Successful for Democratization? Evidence from the Transition Economies of Eastern Europe and Eurasia pp. 636-657

Andreas Freytag and Jac Heckelman

Divided we Stand, United we Fall: Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration Reconsidered pp. 658-686

Christian Ruzzier

Designing Incentives under Multidimensional Performance Measures pp. 687-711

Surajeet Chakravarty and Miltiadis Makris

Should Public Sectors Be Complements of Private Sectors? pp. 712-730

Ikuo Ishibashi and Noriaki Matsushima

Investment under Anarchy pp. 731-753

David Bruner and Robert Oxoby

Volume 168, issue 3, 2012

Political Legitimacy and Technology Adoption pp. 339-361

Metin Cosgel, Thomas J. Miceli and Jared Rubin

Organizational Governance, Leadership, and the Influence of Competition pp. 362-392

Michael Kopel and Clemens Löffler

Monetary Policy Facing Fiscal Indiscipline under Generalized Timing of Actions pp. 393-431

Jan Libich and Petr Stehlík

The Persistence of Goodness pp. 432-443

Ashok S. Guha and Brishti Guha

Long-Run Effects of Foreign Penetration on Privatization Policies pp. 444-454

Sususmu Cato and Toshihiro Matsumura

Mutual Recognition versus National Treatment of Standards in a Classical Monopoly or Oligopoly pp. 455-487

Terence Edwards

Geography versus Institutions: New Perspectives on the Growth of Africa and the Middle East pp. 488-518

Olivier Parent and Abdallah Zouache

The Biased Effect of Aggregated and Disaggregated Income Taxation on Investment Decisions pp. 519-545

Martin Fochmann, Dirk Kiesewetter and Abdolkarim Sadrieh

Volume 168, issue 2, 2012

Inefficient Prebargaining Search pp. 211-223

Birger Wernerfelt

Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence pp. 224-231

Nuno Garoupa and Matteo Rizzolli

Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability, and Care Effort under Asymmetric Information pp. 232-251

Gerard Mondello

Uncertainty and Horizontal Mergers pp. 252-265

Kojun Hamada

Unionisation Structure and Outward Foreign Direct Investment pp. 266-279

Arijit Mukherjee and Kullapat Suetrong

Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms pp. 280-289

Amrish Patel and Edward Cartwright

Labour Incentive Schemes, Effort, and Market Outcomes in a Differentiated Duopoly with Simple Institutional Constraints pp. 290-310

Luciano Fanti and Nicola Meccheri

Mix-and-Match Compatibility in Asymmetric System Markets pp. 311-338

Jong-Hee Hahn and Sang-Hyun Kim

Volume 168, issue 1, 2012

Testing Contracts 29th International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics June 15-18, 2011, Krakow, Poland pp. 1-4

Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine pp. 5-26

Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir

The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine pp. 27-31

Alan D. Schwartz

The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine pp. 27-31

Alan D. Schwartz

The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine pp. 32-37

Urs Schweizer

The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach Doctrine pp. 32-37

Urs Schweizer

The Effect of Contract Regulation on Franchising pp. 38-53

Jonathan Klick, Bruce Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein

Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Longitudinal Data pp. 54-57

Theodore Eisenberg

Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Longitudinal Data pp. 54-57

Theodore Eisenberg

The Effect of Contract Regulation on Franchising pp. 58-61

Andreas Roider

The Effect of Contract Regulation on Franchising pp. 58-61

Andreas Roider

Framing Contracts: Why Loss Framing Increases Effort pp. 62-82

Richard R. W. Brooks, Alexander Stremitzer and Stephan Tontrup

Incentives and Contract Frames pp. 83-88

Claudia Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier

Incentives and Contract Frames pp. 83-88

Claudia Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier

Framing Contracts pp. 89-93

Jeroen van de Ven

Framing Contracts pp. 89-93

Jeroen van de Ven

Does Contract Disclosure Matter? pp. 94-119

Florencia Marotta-Wurgler

Does Disclosure Matter? pp. 120-123

Daniel L. Chen

Does Disclosure Matter? pp. 120-123

Daniel Chen

Experimental Evidence of the Relationship between Reading the Fine Print and Performance of Form-Contract Terms pp. 124-141

Zev J. Eigen

When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, and Performance pp. 142-146

Hans-Bernd Schäfer

When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, and Performance pp. 142-146

Hans-Bernd Schäfer

When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance pp. 147-149

Shyam Sunder

When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance pp. 147-149

Shyam Sunder

Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results pp. 150-170

Claudia Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier

Fair Exclusion pp. 171-175

Christoph Engel

Fair Exclusion pp. 171-175

Christoph Engel

Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results pp. 176-180

Ansgar Wohlschlegel

The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements pp. 181-201

Eric Talley and Drew O'Kane

The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements pp. 202-205

Christian Kellner

The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements pp. 202-205

Christian Kellner

The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements pp. 206-208

Alexander Stremitzer

The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements pp. 206-208

Alexander Stremitzer