Journal of Theoretical Politics

1989 - 2025

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Optimal committee design and political participation pp. 443-466: Nikitas Konstantinidis
Institutional sources of policy bias: A computational investigation pp. 467-491: Robi Ragan
Proliferation, preemption, and intervention in the nuclearization of second-tier states pp. 492-525: Christopher R. Dittmeier
Exploitation, inequality and power pp. 526-545: Roberto Veneziani
The merits of adding complexity: non-separable preferences in spatial models of European Union politics pp. 546-575: Daniel Finke and Andreas Fleig
Elinor Ostrom Prize pp. 576-576: N/a

Information and political institutions pp. 301-308: Alan E Wiseman
Lying aversion, lobbying, and context in a strategic communication experiment pp. 309-337: William Minozzi and Jonathan Woon
Informational loss in bundled bargaining pp. 338-362: Ying Chen and Hülya Eraslan
Elections and reform: The adoption of civil service systems in the U.S. states pp. 363-387: Michael M Ting, James M Snyder, Shigeo Hirano and Olle Folke
Stovepiping pp. 388-411: Sean Gailmard and John W Patty
Ideology and information in policymaking pp. 412-439: Massimo Morelli and Richard Van Weelden

Electoral authoritarianism and democracy: A formal model of regime transitions pp. 153-181: Michael K Miller
Expressive motives and third-party candidates pp. 182-213: Indridi Indridason
Electoral agency in the lab: Learning to throw out the rascals pp. 214-233: Leif Helland and Lars Monkerud
Theories of legislative politics and committee action in the postwar U.S. House of Representatives pp. 234-259: Chris Kypriotis
International bargaining, endogenous domestic constraints, and democratic accountability pp. 260-283: Terrence L Chapman, Johannes Urpelainen and Scott Wolford
Strategic party placement with a dynamic electorate pp. 284-298: James E Monogan

Why conference committees? A theory of conference use in structuring bicameral agreement pp. 3-35: Ryan J. Vander Wielen
Civic initiatives in the context of legal uncertainty pp. 36-62: Martin Gregor and Michael L. Smith
Performance when misinformation increases with experience pp. 63-74: Amihai Glazer
Beyond the leftâ€“right cleavage: Exploring American political choice space pp. 75-104: Melvin Hinich, Xinsheng Liu, Arnold Vedlitz and Charles Lindsey
Public opinion and conflict in the separation of powers: Understanding the Honduran coup of 2009 pp. 105-127: Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson and Joseph Daniel Ura
Resource allocation when different candidates are stronger on different issues pp. 128-149: Patrick Hummel

On the rhetorical strategies of leaders: Speaking clearly, standing back, and stepping down pp. 431-460: Torun Dewan and David Myatt
An alternative mechanism through which economic inequality facilitates collective action: Wealth disparities as a sign of cooperativeness pp. 461-484: Tim Johnson and Oleg Smirnov
Dropping the unitary actor assumption: The impact of intra-party delegation on coalition governance pp. 485-506: Thomas M Meyer
Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule pp. 507-525: Steven Brams and D Marc Kilgour
Qualitative voting pp. 526-554: Rafael Hortala-Vallve
Partisan agenda control in the US house: A theoretical exploration pp. 555-570: Jeffery A Jenkins and Nathan W Monroe
Elinor Ostrom Prize pp. 571-572: N/a

Introduction: What is a â€˜geneâ€™ and why does it matter for political science? pp. 305-327: Peter K Hatemi, Enda Byrne and Rose McDermott
Using genetic information to test causal relationships in cross-sectional data pp. 328-344: Brad Verhulst and Ryne Estabrook
Itâ€™s the end of ideology as we know it pp. 345-369: Peter K Hatemi, Lindon Eaves and Rose McDermott
Geneâ€“environment interactions related to body mass: School policies and social context as environmental moderators pp. 370-388: Jason D Boardman, Michael E Roettger, Benjamin W Domingue, Matthew B McQueen, Brett C Haberstick and Kathleen Mullan Harris
Choosing sides: The genetics of why we go with the loudest pp. 389-408: ZoltÃ¡n Fazekas and Levente Littvay
The genetics of political participation, civic duty, and political efficacy across cultures: Denmark and the United States pp. 409-427: Robert Klemmensen, Peter K Hatemi, Sara Binzer Hobolt, Inge Petersen, Axel Skytthe and AsbjÃ¸rn S NÃ¸rgaard

Bargaining and the effectiveness of international criminal regimes pp. 149-171: Emily Hencken Ritter and Scott Wolford
Demystifying trust: Experimental evidence from Cambodia and Thailand pp. 172-209: William English
Probabilistic voting equilibria under nonlinear candidate payoffs pp. 235-247: Alexei Zakharov
Why does the majority party bother to have minority party members on committees? pp. 248-264: Hong Min Park
Groseclose and Snyder in finite legislatures pp. 265-273: Christian Dippel

Rational incompetence pp. 3-18: Jinhee Jo and Lawrence S. Rothenberg
The lesser evil: Executive accountability with partisan supporters pp. 19-45: Gerard PadrÃ³ i Miquel and Erik Snowberg
A model of political information-processing and learning cooperation in the repeated Prisonerâ€™s Dilemma pp. 46-65: Sung-youn Kim
Modeling the commons as a game with vector payoffs pp. 66-89: Raul P. Lejano and Helen Ingram
Greater than the sum of their parts? When combinations of institutions improve citizensâ€™ decisions pp. 90-109: Cheryl Boudreau
One man, one vote, one time? A model of democratization in the Middle East pp. 110-146: Lisa Blaydes and James Lo