Journal of Theoretical Politics

1989 - 2025

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Collusion, Competition and Democracy pp. 435-470: Stefano Bartolini
Political Timing pp. 471-496: John Gibson
Two-Level Collective Action and Group Identity pp. 497-517: Arieh Gavious and Shlomo Mizrahi
A Theory of Full International Cooperation pp. 519-541: Scott Barrett
On the Geometry of Unanimity Rule pp. 543-553: Josep M. Colomer

Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union? pp. 291-308: Geoffrey Garrett and George Tsebelis
Relevance of Voting Power pp. 309-320: Jan-Erik Lane and Sven Berg
Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making? pp. 321-330: Manfred Holler and Mika WidgrÃ©n
More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union pp. 331-338: Geoffrey Garrett and George Tsebelis
Strategic Power in the European Union pp. 339-366: Bernard Steunenberg, Dieter Schmidtchen and Christian Koboldt
Commons Problems, Collective Action and Efficiency pp. 367-391: Sara Singleton
Adaptive Models and Electoral Instability pp. 393-419: Scott de Marchi
Ignorance-Based Quantitative Models and Their Practical Implications pp. 421-431: Rein Taagepera

The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory pp. 147-169: Gary W. Cox
Contending Conceptions of the Theory of Rational Action pp. 171-202: Karl-Dieter Opp
Credo of a `Reasonable Choice' Modeler pp. 203-206: A Wuffle
What is Political? pp. 207-231: Mark E. Warren
Suppressing Shays' Rebellion pp. 233-260: Michael J. G. Cain and Keith L. Dougherty
Would the Borda Count Have Avoided the Civil War? pp. 261-288: Alexander Tabarrok and Lee Spector

The Chain Store Paradox and Constitutional Politics in Canada pp. 5-36: Patrick James
Asymmetric Information, Delegation, and the Structure of Policy-Making pp. 37-56: David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran
The Power of Ideologically Concentrated Minorities pp. 57-74: Samuel Merrill, Bernard Grofman, Thomas Brunell and William Koetzle
Explorations into the Visualization of Policy Networks pp. 75-106: Ulrik Brandes, Patrick Kenis, JÃ¶rg Raab, Volker Schneider and Dorothea Wagner
From Parliamentarism to Pluralism pp. 107-135: John Coultrap

Modeling Policy Networks pp. 387-388: Thomas KÃ¶nig
The Development of Policy Network Analyses pp. 389-416: Mark Thatcher
The Strength of Weak Ties in Lobbying Networks pp. 417-444: Daniel P. Carpenter, Kevin M. Esterling and David M. J. Lazer
The Formation of Policy Networks pp. 445-471: Thomas KÃ¶nig and Thomas BrÃ¤uninger
Shared Beliefs and Imposed Interdependencies as Determinants of Ally Networks in Overlapping Subsystems pp. 473-505: Matthew Zafonte and Paul Sabatier
Who Steals my Purse Steals Trash pp. 507-530: David Knoke
Comparing Local Policy Networks pp. 531-552: Christian Melbeck
Policy Networks: More Than a Metaphor? pp. 553-575: Franz Urban Pappi and Christian H. C. A. Henning
Dynamic Modeling of Policy Networks in Amsterdam pp. 577-601: Frans N. Stokman and Jaco Berveling

Is There Something Wrong with `Free Action'? pp. 259-273: KristjÃ¡n KristjÃ¡nsson
Actions, Persons and Freedom as Nondomination pp. 275-283: Philip Pettit
Can You Teach the Old Dog New Tricks? pp. 285-290: Wayne Norman
Reply to Pettit and Norman pp. 291-298: KristjÃ¡n KristjÃ¡nsson
Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise pp. 299-326: Georg Vanberg
Rules, Dispute Resolution, and Strategic Behavior pp. 327-338: Alec Stone Sweet
Reply to Stone Sweet pp. 339-346: Georg Vanberg
Developing an Analytical Framework for Multiple-Use Commons pp. 347-383: Victoria M. Edwards and Nathalie A. Steins

Proportional Representation pp. 147-178: Richard F. Potthoff and Steven Brams
Two Stories, One Power Index pp. 179-190: Manfred J. Holler
The Normative Force of Electoral Promises pp. 191-214: Andreas Schedler
Agenda Control by Interest Groups in Eu Social Policy pp. 215-236: Bernhard Boockmann
Is Nomenklatura Rule the Clue to the Riddle of Italian Politics? pp. 237-244: Paolo Martelli
Rejoinder to Martelli pp. 245-249: Mario Ferrero and Giorgio Brosio
Rebuttal to Wuffle and Collet's Supposedly Irrefutable Evidence that Higher Turnout Benefits Republicans pp. 251-255: Bernard Grofman

Partisan Voting and Multiparty Spatial Competition pp. 5-31: James Adams
Grid-Group Theory and Political Ideology pp. 33-58: Richard M. Coughlin and Charles Lockhart
Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited pp. 59-87: Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kolgour
Elections in Double-Member Districts with Nonseparable Voter Preferences pp. 89-110: Dean Lacy and Emerson M. S. Niou
Blame, Game Theory and Economic policy pp. 111-123: Paul Anand
The Inclusiveness of European Decision Rules pp. 125-142: Thomas KÃ¶nig and Thomas BrÃ¤uninger